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,QLWVRQJRLQJLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWR*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKSUDFWLFHVGoogle Search, the Commission 
alleges that Google abuses its dominant position on the web search market by giving 
V\VWHPDWLF IDYRXUDEOH WUHDWPHQW WR LWV µFRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ SURGXFW¶ namely, µ*RRJOH
6KRSSLQJ¶ LQ LWV JHQHUDO VHDUFK UHVXOWVSDJHV. This article analyses whether the conduct in 
question in Google Search can be an abuse under Article 102TFEU (prohibiting the abuse of 
a dominant position in the EU) and if so, under what conditions. The article proceeds by first 
providing a positive assessment of the application of Article 102TFEU and the relevant case 
law to the issues involved in Google Search on the assumption that the Commission may 
seek to place the facts under an existing category of abuse. Three categories of abuse are 
analysed to this end: refusal to deal (including the essential facilities doctrine); 
discrimination; and tying. The article then proceeds to a normative assessment of the 
circumstances under which Article 102TFEU should be applied in Google Search under a 
principled conceptualisation RI µDEXVH¶: one which requires exploitation, exclusion, and a 
lack of an increase in efficiency. The article finds that the facts in Google Search do not meet 
the requirements of the existing law to be found abusive unless the established frameworks 
for the types of abuse examined are unjustifiably disrupted. It also finds that under the 
principled conceptualisation of abuse adopted in this article, the facts in Google Search do 
not represent the type of conduct that should be found abusive either. 
 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3 
II. Positive Assessment of the Alleged Abuse ........................................................................... 9 
A. Refusal to deal and the essential facilities doctrine ........................................................... 9 
i. The relevant input ......................................................................................................... 11 
ii. The requirements for refusal to deal to be abusive ....................................................... 13 
a. Refusal to provide access to physical property ..................................................... 13 
b. Refusal to provide access to intangible property including property protected by   
IP rights .................................................................................................................. 20 
                                            

 School of Law, University of Leeds. The research for this article has been supported by Google but the views 
expressed therein represent solely those of the author. The research was not undertaken on behalf of the 
University of Leeds and therefore the University owes no responsibilities or liability in relation to this work. 
The author would like to thank Peter Whelan and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. 
The usual disclaimer applies. The author can be contacted at pinarakmanleeds@gmail.com. 
2 
 
c. Estoppel abuse ....................................................................................................... 27 
d. Objective Justification ........................................................................................... 30 
B. Discrimination.................................................................................................................. 32 
i. Transactions with other trading parties ......................................................................... 34 
ii. Competitive disadvantage ............................................................................................. 38 
iii.   Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions ........................................... 40 
iv.   The relevance of a downstream/upstream market and vertical integration .................. 43 
v. Objective justification and exclusionary effect............................................................. 50 
C. Tying ................................................................................................................................ 52 
i. Two separate products/services .................................................................................... 54 
ii. Lack of customer choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product ............ 57 
iii.   Foreclosure of competition ........................................................................................... 60 
iv.   Objective justification ................................................................................................... 63 
III. Normative Assessment of the Alleged Abuse ................................................................... 64 
A. The concept of abuse and its requirements ...................................................................... 66 
B. Application of the framework to the facts in Google Search .......................................... 69 
i. Exploitation ................................................................................................................... 69 
ii. Exclusion....................................................................................................................... 73 
iii.   Lack of an increase in efficiency .................................................................................. 74 
C. The Potential Remedy ...................................................................................................... 75 
IV. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 81 
Annex 1 .................................................................................................................................... 84 
Annex 2 .................................................................................................................................... 85 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The European Commission started investigating Google in November 2010 for allegedly 
abusing a dominant position contrary to Article 102TFEU. Despite pursuing negotiations 
with Google which culminated in commitments WKDW RIILFLDOO\ µDGGUHVV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
FRQFHUQV¶1 the Commission issued a Statement of Objections (SO) to Google in April 2015 
followed by a Supplementary SO in July 2016. The preliminary conclusion of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LV WKDW *RRJOH JLYHV V\VWHPDWLF IDYRXUDEOH WUHDWPHQW WR LWV
µFRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ SURGXFW¶ FXUUHQWO\ FDOOHG µ*RRJOH 6KRSSLQJ¶ LQ LWV JHQHUDO VHDUFK
results pages, eg by showing Google Shopping more prominently on the screen.2 
µ&RPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJSURGXFWV¶DOORZFRQVXPHUVWRVHDUFKIRUSURGXFWVRQRQOLQHVKRSSLQJ
websites and compare prices between different merchants.3 The Commission alleges that 
when a consumer enters a shopping-UHODWHG TXHU\ LQ *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK HQJLQH µ*RRJOH
6HDUFK¶*RRJOH6KRSSLQJ LVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\GLVSOD\HGSURPLQHQWO\DW WKH WRSRI WKHVHDUFK
results irrespective of whether it is the most relevant response to the query.4  The 
Commission interprets this to VXJJHVWWKDW*RRJOH¶V&RPPHUFLDO3URGXFWµ*RRJOH6KRSSLQJ
&RPPHUFLDO 8QLW¶ LH WKH JURXS RI 3URGXFW /LVWLQJ $GV RQ JHQHUDO UHVXOW SDJHV LV QRW
subject to the same algorithms as other comparison shopping services.5  
                                            
1
 For then-&RPP¶U $OPXQLD¶V VWDWHPHQW WKDW WKH FRPPLWPHQWV DGGUHVV WKH FRPSHWLWLRQ FRQFHUQV RI WKH
Commission, see (XU &RPP¶n Press Release IP/14/116, Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google 
comparable display of specialised search rivals (Feb. 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
116_en.htm.  Under Regulation 1/2003 where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an 
infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns 
expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision make 
those commitments binding on the undertakings; Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 
Article 9. 
2
 Eur. &RPP¶Q3UHVV5HOHDVH IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on 
comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4780_en.htm. 
3
 Press Release, supra note 2. 
4
 (XU&RPP¶n Statement STATEMENT/15/4785, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on antitrust decisions 
concerning Google (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-4785_en.htm. 
5
 6WDWHPHQW E\ &RPP¶r Vestager, supra note 4. In response to a search query, Google displays free search 
results that are sometimes accompanied by ads that are paid for by advertisers. The revenue from these ads, 
enables Google to provide the search engine services to the users for free. Product Listing Ads provide 
merchants with an alternative to text ads by including images, prices, and merchant information. See also infra 
note 14 below. For background information, see Dan Friedman, Announcing Product List Ads (Nov. 11, 2009), 
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According to the Commission, GRRJOH¶VFRQGXFWPD\DUWLILFLDOO\GLYHUW WUDIILF IURP
rival comparison shopping services, hindering their ability to compete.6 Further, the 
&RPPLVVLRQ VXJJHVWV WKDW *RRJOH¶V FRQGXFW KDV D QHJDWLYH LPSDFW RQ FRQVXPHUV DQG
innovation.7 For the Commission, users arguably do not necessarily see the most relevant 
comparison shopping results in response to their queries, and that incentives to innovate from 
rivals are lowered as they know that however good their product, they will not benefit from 
WKH VDPH SURPLQHQFH DV *RRJOH¶V SURGXFW8 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SUHOLPLQDU\ YLHZ LV WKDW
*RRJOH¶V IDYRXUDEOH WUHDWPHQW RI *RRJOH 6KRSSLQJ LV DQ DEXVH RI *RRJOH¶V GRPLQDQW
position in general internet search.9 
The SO¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIUHPHGLHVadopts the preliminary view that in order to remedy 
the conduct, Google should treat its own comparison shopping service and those of rivals in 
the same way.10 The Commission argues that this remedy would not interfere with Google;s 
algorithms or how it designs its search results pages.11 The Commission suggests that it 
ZRXOGPHDQWKDWZKHQ*RRJOHVKRZVFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVHUYLFHVLQUHVSRQVHWRDXVHU¶V
query, the most relevant service(s) ZRXOG EH VHOHFWHG WR DSSHDU LQ *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK UHVXOWV
pages.12  
                                                                                                                                       
http://adwords.blogspot.be/2009/11/announcing-product-listing-ads.html; Sameer Samat, Building a Better 
Shopping Experience (May 31 2012), https://commerce.googleblog.com/2012/05/building-better-shopping-
experience.html; Santiago Andrigo, Google Shopping Now Available in 8 New Countries (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://adwords.blogspot.be/2013/11/google-shopping-now-available-in-8-new.html; Sameer Samat, Google 
Shopping Global Transition Is Underway (Feb. 21, 2013), https://commerce.googleblog.com/2013/02/google-
shopping-global-transition-is_21.html; Samer Samat, Connect, Click and Convert Around the World with 
Google Shopping (Jun. 11, 2013), http://adwords.blogspot.be/2013/05/shoppingglobal.html.  
6
 Press Release, supra note 20RUHVSHFLILFDOO\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSUHOLPLQDU\FRQFOXVLons in its SO are that: 
(i) Google systematically positions and prominently displays its comparison shopping service in its general 
search results pages, irrespective of its merits; (ii) Google does not apply to its own comparison shopping 
service the system of penalties which it applies to other comparison shopping services on the basis of defined 
SDUDPHWHUV DQG ZKLFK FDQ OHDG WR WKH ORZHULQJRI WKH UDQN LQ ZKLFK WKH\ DSSHDU LQ*RRJOH¶V JHQHUDO VHDUFK
UHVXOWV SDJHV LLL )URRJOH *RRJOH¶V ILUVW FRPSDULVRn shopping service, did not benefit from any favourable 
WUHDWPHQWDQGSHUIRUPHGSRRUO\LYDVDUHVXOWRI*RRJOH¶VV\VWHPDWLFIDYRXULQJRILWVVXEVHTXHQWFRPSDULVRQ
VKRSSLQJVHUYLFHVµ*RRJOH3URGXFW6HDUFK¶DQGµ*RRJOH6KRSSLQJ¶ERWKH[SHULHQFHGKLJKHU rates of growth, to 
the detriment of rival comparison shopping services; (XU &RPP¶n Fact Sheet MEMO/15/4781, Antitrust: 
Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm. 
7
 Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
8
 Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
9
 6WDWHPHQWE\&RPP¶r Vestager, supra note 4. 
10
 Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
11
 Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
12
 Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
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The Commission appears to be using Google Search as a test case since it has 
LQGLFDWHGWKDWµ>L@IDQLQIULQJHPHQWLVSURYHQDFDVHIRFXVLQJRQFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJFRXOG
potentially establish a broader precedent for enforcing EU competition rules in other 
LQVWDQFHVRI*RRJOHIDYRXULQJLWVRZQVHUYLFHVRYHUFRPSHWLQJVHUYLFHV¶13 The possibility of 
such further intervention arises due to the fact that Google Search (like other search engines) 
KDVPRYHGIURPGLVSOD\LQJµWHQ-blue-OLQNV¶LQUHVSRQVHWRVHDUFKTXHULHVWRJHQHUDWLQJDOLVW
of results that integrates specialist (vertical) results such as news, video, image, local, 
VKRSSLQJHWFLQRQHVHDUFKUHVXOWNQRZQDVµ8QLYHUVDO6HDUFK¶14 Consequently, there is a 
possibility that these integrated search features other than shopping may give rise to similar 
cases if Google Search sets a precedent by finding an infringement. The importance of 
reaching the right decision in Google Search, therefore, cannot be overemphasised since the 
case will potentially set a precedent not just for other Google services similar to shopping, but 
also for other businesses in similarly innovative technology markets which provide services 
with multiple features on multi-sided markets. The case is also of fundamental importance as 
it represents an ideal opportunity for the Commission to demonstrate that it wishes to protect 
competition (and thereby the interests of consumers) rather than protect competitors. 
Concerns have already been voiced that an adverse finding in Google Search may protect 
competitors and disadvantage consumers due to chilling innovation and competition.15 
 The assessments of market definition and dominance are early hurdles in reaching the 
correct outcome in Google Search. First, there is the issue of what the correctly identified, 
relevant market is for the purposes of the investigation. Second, there is the issue of 
determining whether Google holds market power in a properly defined market, which ± 
despite apparent high market shares ± is far from a foregone conclusion. In its investigation, 
                                            
13
 6WDWHPHQWE\&RPP¶r Vestager, supra note 4. 
14
 Google introduced Froogle in 2002, grouped product results in 2003 and Universal Search in 2007. In 2008, 
Google introduced advanced ad formats for promoting merchant product offers. These evolved into the Google 
Shopping ComPHUFLDO 8QLW WKDW *RRJOH VKRZV WRGD\ DQG WKDW LV WKH VXEMHFW PDWWHU RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
investigation. Froogle became Google Shopping in 2012. For a historical overview of developments, see 
http://www.google.com/about/company/history/.  
15
 See eg Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the 
Case Against Google, 34 (1) HARV. J. L.  & PUB. POL¶Y 171, 178 (2011) (in the US context); Andrea Renda, 
Searching for Harm or Harming Search?, 38-39 (CEPS Special Report No 118/Sept. 2015), 
http://www.ceps.eu/publications/searching-harm-or-harming-search-look-european-commission%E2%80%99s-
antitrust-investigation; Florian Wagner-Von Papp, 6KRXOG *RRJOH¶V 6HFUHW 6DXFH EH 2UJDQLF" 16 (2) 
MELBOURNE J. INT¶L L. 609, 646-647 (2015). 
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the Commission has identified three separate markets (namely, the markets for web search, 
search advertising, and comparison shopping) reaching the preliminary finding that Google is 
dominant on the first two of them.16  Several commentators have argued that: first, the 
markets that the Commission has identified in this context are unlikely to be the relevant 
markets, and, at the least, are too narrowly defined; and, second, on a correctly identified 
relevant market, Google is unlikely to be dominant.17  A finding that Google is not dominant 
on the correctly identified relevant market would clearly be the end of the &RPPLVVLRQ¶Vcase 
against Google. An incorrect definition of the relevant market and/or an incorrect finding of 
dominDQFHZRXOGDOVRVXIILFHIRUWKHDQQXOPHQWRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQin case of an 
appeal since it is inconceivable that the remainder of such a decision could survive such a 
finding.  
This article aims to analyse whether the conduct in question in Google Search can be 
an abuse under Article 102TFEU and, if so, under what conditions. This article is, thus, 
limited to the assessment of the potential theory of abuse, alongside the discussion of a 
potential remedy. For the sake of full engagement with the conduct aspect of the case, the 
remainder of this article bases its discussion on the relevant markets identified by the 
Commission and the market power allegedly held by Google on them. 
TKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V DFFXVDWLRQV GR QRW UHYHDO ZKDW W\SH RI DEXVH WKH &RPPLVVLRQ
FRQVLGHUV *RRJOH¶V FRQGXFW WR IDOO XQGHU 7KLV KDV OHG WR GLIIHUHQW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV E\
commentators of the type of abuse the investigated conduct might constitute. At one level, 
how the conduct is categorised is legally irrelevant since Article 102TFEU only lists 
examples of abuse and it is not necessary for a given conduct to fall within one of the listed 
                                            
16
 (XU&RPP¶n Memo, Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address competition 
concerns ± questions and answers (Apr. 25, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-383_en.htm; 
Statement by CRPP¶U9HVWDJHUsupra note 4. 
17
 See eg Wagner von-Papp, supra note 15, at 639-640; Renda, supra note 15, at 31-32; Christian Kersting and 
Sebastian Dworschak, Does Google Hold a Dominant Market Position? ± Addressing the (Minor) Significance 
of High Online User Shares 6 (Ifo Schnelldienst 16/2014, 7), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495300; Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the 
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 292 (2013); James D. Ratliff and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to 
Antitrust Liability?, 10 (3) J. COMP. L. & ECON. 517, 518-519 (2014); Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online 
Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets, 36 (2) WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 
195, 217-218 (2013). 
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categories of conduct to be found abusive.18 Given the illustrative nature of the list of 
SUDFWLFHVLQ$UWLFOH7)(8ZKDWPDWWHUVLVKRZRQHLQWHUSUHWVWKHFRQFHSWRIµDEXVH¶DQG
whether the conduct under investigation constitutes an abuse under that relevant 
interpretation. CommentatoUV LQ VHHNLQJ WR DVVHVV *RRJOH¶V FRQGXFW XQGHU RQH RI WKH
established categories of abusive conduct, have also tried to examine the practice on the basis 
of existing case law on these different types of abusive conduct.19 This is clearly a valuable 
and important exercise in terms of assessing the potential application of the case law on 
Article 102 TFEU in Google Search. However, at some level, this is also not authoritative for 
two reasons: first, WKH FRQFHSWRI µDEXVH¶ FRYHUVSUDFWLFHs not yet found abusive in a case, 
including novel practices due to the non-exhaustive nature of the provision; and, second, 
there is no rule of precedent in EU law.20 It is therefore possible for the EU Commission 
(and, should there be an infringement decision and an appeal, for the EU Courts) to not apply 
any of the existing case law to the facts involved in Google Search or to change the 
parameters of the existing case law concerning their application in Google Search. This 
underlines the importance of a normative assessment of the issues in Google Search and of 
the examination of how the law should be applied to the facts. Consequently, this article 
conducts two separate assessments. It proceeds by first providing a positive assessment of the 
application of Article 102TFEU and the relevant case law to the issues involved in Google 
                                            
18
 For the list of examples of abuse in Article 102TFEU not being exhaustive, see eg Case 6/72, Europemballage 
Corporation and &RQWLQHQWDO&DQ&RPSDQ\,QFY&RPP¶n, 1973 E.C.R. 215, ¶ 26. Whether or not the conduct 
is a novel type of abuse may be relevant for the imposition of a fine. Although the fact that the Commission and 
the EU courts have not yet had the opportunity to rule specifically on certain conduct does not, in itself, prevent 
the Commission from imposing a fine (see Motorola ¶ 560 citing Case C-457/10 P, $VWUD=HQHFDY&RPP¶n,  
ECLI:EU:C:2012:770, ¶ 164 (ECJ Dec. 6, 2012), occasionally, the novelty of the abuse has led to the imposition 
of a symbolic fine, a reduced fine or no fine at all; see eg Case AT.39985 ± Motorola-Enforcement of GPRS 
Standard Essential Patents, &RPP¶n Decision, ¶ 561 (summary at 2014 O.J. (C344) 6), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39985/39985_928_16.pdf; Case C-62/86, AKZO 
Chemie BV v. &RPP¶n,  1991 E.C.R. I-3359, ¶ 163; Case COMP/C-1/36.915 ± Deutsche Post ± Interception of 
Cross-Border Mail &RPP¶Q Decision, ¶ 193, 2001 O.J. (L331) 40, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2001.331.01.0040.01.ENG. 
19
 See eg Renato Nazzini, Google and the (Ever-stretching) Boundaries of Article 102 TFUE [sic] , 6 (5) J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 301 (2015); Nicolas Petit, Theories of Self-Preferencing under Article 102 TFEU: 
A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf, (2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592253; Ioannis Lianos and Evgenia 
Motchenkova, Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine Market, 9 (2) J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 419 (2013). 
20
 For there being no rule of precedent, see eg Anthony Arnull, Owning up to Fallibility: Precedent and the 
Court of Justice, 30 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 247, 248, 262 (1993); PAUL LASOK, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 171 (7th ed. 2001); PAUL CRAIG AND GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 63 (5th ed. 2011).  
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Search on the assumption that the Commission may seek to place the facts under an existing 
category of abuse. It then proceeds to a normative assessment of the circumstances under 
which Article 102TFEU should be applied in Google Search under a particular, principled 
conceptualisation RIµDEXVH¶ Its novel contribution is thus provided in its containing both a 
thorough assessment of the positive law, as well as a normative analysis of the relevant issues 
XQGHURQHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµDEXVH¶ 
To achieve its two objectives, this article comprises two parts. Section II examines the 
PRVWOLNHO\H[LVWLQJFDWHJRULHVRIDEXVLYHFRQGXFWXQGHUZKLFK*RRJOH¶VFRQGXFWPLJKWfall. 
It has been argued that the alleged abuse in Google Search does not squarely fit any of the 
established categories of abuse.21 The closest types of abuse to the allegedly abusively 
conduct in Google Search are refusal to deal (including the essential facilities doctrine); 
discrimination; and tying. Thus, section II is divided into three parts examining each of these 
abuses and their application in Google Search. Underlying all of these possible types of 
conduct is a theory that Google leverages its market power on the search engine market to 
another market, namely the market for comparison shopping sites.22 Section III presents a 
normative legal assessment of the circumstances under which Article 102TFEU should apply 
to the facts of Google Search. The particular conceptualisation of abuse on which this 
normative assessment is based would require there to be exploitation, exclusion and a lack of 
DQLQFUHDVHLQHIILFLHQF\UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VFRQGXFWEHIRUH a finding 
of abuse can be made.23 This normative assessment is complemented by the discussion of the 
potential remedy in Google Search. Section IV concludes by finding that the facts in Google 
Search do not meet the requirements of the existing law to be found abusive unless the 
established frameworks for the types of abuse examined are unjustifiably disrupted. It also 
finds that under the conceptualisation of abuse adopted in this article, the facts in Google 
Search do not represent the type of conduct that should be found abusive either. 
 
                                            
21
 Nazzini, supra note 19, 313. 
22
 See StatemeQWE\&RPP¶U9HVWDJHUsupra note 4. 
23
 This conceptualisation of abuse was developed by the current author in PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF 
ABUSE IN EU COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACHES (2012). For a detailed explanation and 
justification of this approach, see ibid Chapter 8 in particular. 
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II. Positive Assessment of the Alleged Abuse  
 
A. Refusal to deal and the essential facilities doctrine 
Many commentators have associated the alleged abuse in Google Search with refusal to deal 
and discussed whether Google Search is in fact DQ µHVVHQWLDO IDFLOLW\¶.24 Moreover, 
considering the remedy that the Commission appears to be seeking, namely that of applying 
the same algorithm that Google applies to Google Shopping to all comparison shopping 
sites,25 one could argue that the remedy (and therefore the alleged abuse) concerns the access 
RIFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHV WR*RRJOH¶VSURGXFW (the search engine) and the conditions of 
that access, namely how these websites appear on the general result pages. Taking this 
argument to its logical conclusion, the question at issue in Google Search can be restated as 
whether Google has a duty to deal with the operators of websites such as comparison 
VKRSSLQJVLWHVWKDWSURYLGHFRPSHWLQJVHUYLFHVWR*RRJOH¶VRZQVHUYLFHVE\SURYLGLQJWKHP
access to Google Search on certain terms which ensure that their services are subject to the 
same rules that Google applies to the display of its own services (such as shopping results) on 
*RRJOH6HDUFKLH*RRJOH¶VRZQSURSULHWDU\SURGXFW 
As acknowledged by the Commission, generally speaking, any undertaking, including 
a dominant one, should have the right to choose its trading partners and to freely dispose of 
its property.26 Intervention on competition law grounds where the application of Article 
102TFEU would impose an obligation of supply on the dominant undertaking therefore 
requires careful consideration, not least because of its potential to undermine both the 
GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V DQG LWV ULYDOV¶ LQFHQWLYHV WR LQYHVW DQG LQQRYDWH, something which 
would not be in the interests of consumers.27 Competition concerns typically arise when the 
GRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJFRPSHWHVRQWKHµGRZQVWUHDPPDUNHW¶ZLWKWKHEX\HUZKRm it refuses 
to supply.28 ,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHWHUPµGRZQVWUHDPPDUNHW¶UHIHUVWRWKHPDUNHWon which the 
                                            
24
 See eg Bo Vesterdorf, Theories of Self-Preferencing and Duty to Deal ± Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 1 (1) 
COMPETITION L. & POL¶Y DEBATE 4 (2015); Petit, supra note 19; Lisa Mays, The Consequences of Search Bias: 
+RZ$SSOLFDWLRQRIWKH(VVHQWLDO)DFLOLWLHV'RFWULQH5HPHGLHV*RRJOH¶V8QUHVWULFWHG0RQRSRO\RQ6HDUFKLQ
the United States and Europe, 83 (2) GEO. WASH. L. REV. 721 (2015); Lao, supra note 17. 
25
 See StatemeQWE\&RPP¶U9HVWDJHUsupra note 4. 
26
 (XU&RPP¶n, *XLGDQFHRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V(QIRUFHPHQW3ULRULWLHVLQ$SSO\LQJ$UWLFOHRIWKH(&7UHDW\
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 75. 
27
 Guidance, supra noten 26, ¶ 75. 
28
 Guidance, supra noten 26, ¶ 76. 
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refused input is needed to manufacture a product or produce a service.29 This is indeed the 
only type of refusal to deal that the Commission discusses in its Guidance, which suggests 
that it is the only type of refusal to deal that is a SULRULW\ LQ WHUPV RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
enforcement.30 This type of refusal to deal covers a broad range of practices including refusal 
to grant access WR DQ µHVVHQWLDO IDFLOLW\¶ RU D QHWZRUN31 $Q µHVVHQWLDO IDFLOLW\¶ LQ WXUQ LV
defined DV µD IDFLOLW\RU LQIUDVWUXFWXUHZLWKRXW DFFHVV WRZKLFKFRPSHWLWRUVFDQQRWSURYLGH
VHUYLFHVWRWKHLUFXVWRPHUV¶32 
In Google Search, the GuiGDQFH¶V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI UHIXVDO WR GHDO faces the 
problem that, as discussed below, Google is unlikely to be a vertically integrated undertaking 
which is DFWLYHRQWKHµXSVWUHDP¶PDUNHWRIVHDUFK DQGZKLFKSURYLGHVDQµLQSXW¶QHFHVVDU\
WR SURYLGH D VHUYLFH RQ WKH µGRZQVWUHDP¶ PDUNHW RI FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ ZKHUH LW LV DOVR
present.33 However, given that much of the commentary to date suggests that this may indeed 
be the theory of harm underlying the allegations, this sub-section will assume that the market 
positioning of Google Search and comparison shopping sites could be considered to fit into 
the categorisation of upstream and downstream levels of production or a similar positioning. 
1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVHSDUDWHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU*RRJOHSURYLGHVDQµLQSXW¶ZKLFKLVQHHGHGLQ
order to provide the service on the other, neighbouring market and the supply of which is 
refused by the dominant undertaking is one that has to be further examined. After a brief 
LQTXLU\LQWRZKDWWKLVµLQSXW¶PLJKWEHLPPHGLDWHO\EHORZi), this sub-section will turn to the 
requirements for refusal to deal to be abusive under the case law (ii). This assessment will 
specifically examine the requirements for such an abuse concerning refusal to supply physical 
property (ii.a); the requirements for such an abuse concerning refusal to supply intangible 
property including property that is protected by IP rights (ii.b); the so-FDOOHGµHVWRSSHODEXVH¶
which concerns the conditions of supply where supply has been provided voluntarily (ii.c), 
                                            
29
 Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 76. 
30
 Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 76. 
31
 Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 78. 
32
 Case IV-34.689 ± Sea Containers v Stena Sealink ± Interim Measures, &RPP¶n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8, 
¶ 66 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31994D0019. 
33
 See infra text after note 168 for the discussion of vertical integration. Vertical integration is considered to be 
more immediately relevant and fundamentally important for the abuse of discrimination, which explains why it 
is discussed under discrimination below. 
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DQGILQDOO\µREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ZKLFKFDQMXVWLI\FRQGXFWWKDWZRXOGRWKHUZLVHEHIRXQG
abusive (ii.d). 
i. The relevant input 
7KHILUVWLVVXHWKDWQHHGVWREHH[SORUHGLVZKDWWKHUHOHYDQWµLQSXW¶WKDWLVQRWEHLQJVXSSOLHG
is. This is not obvious from the &RPPLVVLRQ¶Vallegations, which focus on the argument of 
µVHOI-IDYRXULQJ¶, without much detail.34 The closest explanation of what the input can be is 
found in a statement by Commissioner Vestager, who UHPDUNHG WKDW µ>W@KH FRPPHUFLDO
LPSRUWDQFH RI DSSHDULQJ SURPLQHQWO\ LQ *RRJOH¶V JHQHUDO VHDUFK UHVXOWV LV REYLRXV¶35 
Therefore, the input could be (i) the free traffic to comparison shopping sites that being 
GLVSOD\HG RQ *RRJOH¶V JHQHUDO UHVXOW SDJHV SURYLGHV WR WKHVH VLWHV RU LL D SDUWLFXODU
SRVLWLRQLQJDQGUDQNLQJRQ*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOUHVXOWSDJHVHJDSSHDULQJRQWKHILUVWSage of 
results).36 Although the value of a particular position in the results is also linked to the traffic 
WKDWWKLVSRVLWLRQDQGUDQNLQJZRXOGSURYLGHWRWKHFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHVµEHLQJUDQNHG
SURPLQHQWO\¶HWFLVDPRUHVSHFLILFW\SHRILQSXWWKDQµUHFHLYLQJIUHHWUDIILF¶DQGZRXOGKDYH
different implications in the context of remedies. The fact that the Commissioner noted the 
importance of appearing prominently LQ*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOUHVXOWVIRUDFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJ
VLWH VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH µLQSXW¶ LQ question might be a particular minimum ranking position 
DQGRUGLVSOD\VLWXDWLRQRQ*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOUHVXOWSDJHV7KHTXHVWLRQLQGoogle Search is, 
therefore, whether either receiving free traffic or being displayed in a certain position, etc on 
*RRJOH¶Vgeneral result pages is a necessary input to provide a service, namely comparison 
shopping.  
It has been argued that, at face value, there is no abusive refusal to supply in Google 
Search because ± as will be argued below concerning discrimination ± there is no trading 
relationship between a search engine and specialist (vertical) search sites or any other site 
IURP ZKLFK LQIRUPDWLRQ LV REWDLQHG WR UHVSRQG WR D XVHU¶V TXHU\37 Moreover, Google is 
displaying rival specialist search websites (such as comparison shopping sites) in its own 
                                            
34
 See Press Release, supra note 2.  
35
 See 6WDWHPHQWE\&RPP¶r Vestager, supra note 4.  
36
 See eg Lianos and Motchenkova, supra note 19, at 436 suggesting the possibility that the refusal concerns the 
refusal to grant access to the highest ranking in the search engine or to being ranked on the first page of results. 
37
 Nazzini, supra note 19, at 307. 
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search results.38 Furthermore, there is no contractual or technological coercion of consumers 
to choose results higher up on the search result pages.39 These comments suggest that the 
refusal to deal theory wouOGRQO\ZRUN LI WKHµLQSXW¶EHLQJQHFHVVDU\ IRUFRPSHWLQJRQ WKH
comparison shopping market is not just appearing in Google¶V general search results, but 
appearing in a certain position and ranking in these results: provided that the comparison 
shopping sites appear somewhere on the list of results, one cannot argue that the supply of the 
µLQSXW¶LVEHLQJUHIXVHGLIWKHµLQSXW¶LVVLPSO\WKDWRIDSSHDULQJLQ*RRJOH¶V general search 
results rather than appearing in a particular way in those results. If the µinput¶ is that of being 
positioned or displayed in a certain way, this would imply that to remedy the conduct, Google 
would have to ensure that the comparison shopping sites appear prominently in the general 
VHDUFKUHVXOWVLHLQDFHUWDLQSRVLWLRQDQGUDQNLQJ'HVSLWHWKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDW
µ>WKH\@ ZRXOG QRW ZDQW WR LQWHUIHUH ZLWK *RRJOH¶V GHVLJQ FKRLFHV RU KRZ LWV DOJRULWKPV
ZRUN¶40 it is difficult to envisage how the conduct could be remedied without imposing on 
Google the use of an algorithm that would ensure that certain display conditions are satisfied 
such as prominent display, etc. Yet, such an imposition would not only interfere with the core 
RI*RRJOH¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHODQGEXVLQHVVMXGJHPHQWLWZRXOGDOVRFRQVWLWXWHWKHSURWHFWLRQRI
the commercial interests of the competitors irrespective of the benefits or otherwise of such 
an intervention for users of the search engine. This is because underlying such a remedy is 
the assumption that consumers would benefit from the prominent display of such competitors 
more than they do from, for example, the current, or indeed future, configurations of the 
result pages. However, this reflects a value judgement by the Commission and is arguably, 
paternalistic.41 In fact, it has been posited that not being able to access a market because the 
dominant player is impeding access to distribution channels or forms of supply is very 
different from when a dominant player fails to actively promote competing services through 
its own service.42 It is noteworthy that the Commission itself has held that there is no 
obligation placed on a dominant producer to subsidise competition to itself.43 All in all, the 
                                            
38
 Nazzini, supra note 19, at 307; Wagner-Von Papp, supra note 15, at 642. 
39
 Wagner-Von Papp, supra note 15, at 643. 
40
 StatemeQWE\&RPP¶U9HVWDJHUsupra note 4. 
41
 Wagner-von Papp, supra note 15, at 646. 
42
  Renda, supra note 15, at 33. 
43
 Case IV/32.279 ± BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim measures, &RPP¶n Decision, 1987 O.J. (L 286) 36, ¶ 19 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31987D0500.  
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ODFNRIFODULW\FRQFHUQLQJZKDWH[DFWO\PLJKWEHWKHµLQSXW¶EHLQJUHIXVHGE\*RRJOHDQGWKH
implications of identifying the input in certain ways for the business model of Google 
inevitably raise questions concerning the legal feasibility and appropriateness of a theory 
based on a refusal-to-deal-type abuse in Google Search. However, the rest of this sub-section 
ZLOO DVVXPH WKDW WKHUH LV VXFK DQ µLQSXW¶ WKDW *RRJOH Fould but fails to provide, and will 
examine the conditions under which such a failure would constitute an abusive refusal to deal 
under Article 102TFEU. 
ii. The requirements for refusal to deal to be abusive 
As refusal to deal is not an abuse explicitly stipulated in Article 102TFEU, its legal 
assessment inevitably involves examination of the relevant case law. That case law can be 
categorised as that concerning the refusal to supply/provide access to physical property or the 
refusal to supply/provide access to intangible property, including that protected by IP rights. 
There is debate whether the duty to deal should differ depending on the type of property, with 
some arguing that both the refusal to deal in physical property and the refusal to deal in IP-
protected property should be subject to the same rules.44 The jurisprudence has developed 
different conditions for these different types of refusal to deal; the following text will 
therefore examine refusal to provide access to physical property separately from refusal to 
provide access to intangible property including property protected by IP rights. 
a. Refusal to provide access to physical property 
The EU refusal to supply case law is generally deemed to start with Commercial Solvents, 
where the input whose supply was refused was a raw material necessary to produce a 
derivative, ethambutol (a type of anti-tuberculosis drug).45 After having supplied a 
downstream customer with the raw material for some years, Commercial Solvents 
discontinued the supply when it started competing on the downstream market. This was 
found to be abusive by the Court of Justice (CoJ).46 Importantly, the CoJ indicated that if, on 
the raw material market, there was another raw material that could be substituted without 
                                            
44
 See ROBERT 2¶'ONOGHUE AND JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 529 (2nd 
ed. 2013); Nazzini, supra note 19, at 309. 
45
 Joined Cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v &RPP¶n, 
1974 E.C.R. 223. 
46
 Commercial Solvents, supra note 45, ¶ 25. 
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difficulty for the raw material being refused, then this could have invalidated the argument 
that Commercial Solvents had a dominant position on the market for the raw material in the 
first place.47 Applying this to Google Search, if the input allegedly being refused is traffic to 
a website, then it is questionable that the case falls within the scope of the refusal to deal case 
law, since there are clearly available alternatives to Google for generating traffic to a 
website.48 This would (and does) indeed raise the question whether Google can be dominant 
on the relevant market for the purposes of a theory of harm based on refusal to supply free 
traffic to certain websites. However, as noted above, for present purposes, it is assumed that it 
can be established that Google is dominant on a properly defined relevant market. 
Some other cases of refusal to deal in physical property involved the duty to provide 
access to physical infrastructure and often ports.49 However, it was not until Bronner that the 
legal conditions under which access could be ordered were clarified by the EU Courts.50 In 
Bronner, a preliminary reference ruling, the CoJ was asked to rule whether the conduct of 
Mediaprint, a press undertaking holding a very large share of the daily newspaper market in 
Austria and which also operated the only nationwide newspaper home delivery scheme, in 
refusing to provide access to Bronner, the publisher of a rival newspaper with a small 
circulation, to that delivery scheme was abusive. Despite the fact that Mediaprint had 
provided such access to anoWKHU QHZVSDSHU DV SDUW RI D SDFNDJH RI VHUYLFHV 0HGLDSULQW¶V
refusal to provide access to Bronner was suggested not to be abusive by the CoJ.51 In 
clarifying the conditions for such conduct to be abusive, the Court emphasised that it is not 
just necessary to prove that the refusal of the service is likely to eliminate all competition in 
the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting access and that the refusal 
cannot be objectively justified, it is also necessary to prove that the service in itself is 
indispensable WR FDUU\ RQ WKDW SHUVRQ¶V EXVLQHVV DQG WKDW WKHUH LV QR DFWXDO RU SRWHQWLDO
                                            
47
 Commercial Solvents, supra note 45, ¶ 15. 
48
 Traffic to these websites can be generated, inter alia, through advertising on search engines; offering of 
mobile apps; offline advertising; repeat visits from satisfied customers; etc. 
49
 See eg Sealink, supra note 32; Case 94/119/EC ± Port of Rødby, &RPP¶n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 55) 52 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31994D0119; Case IV/33/544 ± British-
Midland/Aer Lingus, &RPP¶n Decision, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31992D0213.   
50
 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 529. 
51
 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co 
KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co 
KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791. 
15 
 
substitute in existence for the relevant service.52 Moreover, regarding indispensability, it is 
not enough for a party seeking access to argue that it is not economically viable for it to 
create an alternative due its small scale.53 In establishing whether there are substitutes or not, 
it is also not UHOHYDQW WKDW VRPH RI WKHVH VXEVWLWXWHV PD\ EH µOHVV DGYDQWDJHRXV¶ IRU WKH
competitor in question than using the service of the dominant undertaking.54 For access to be 
deemed indispensable, it would bH QHFHVVDU\ µDW WKH YHU\ OHDVW¶ WKDW LW LV QRW HFRQRPLFDOO\
viable to create a second delivery scheme for an undertaking that has similar scale to the 
undertaking which has developed the existing scheme.55 In other words, the standard is an 
objective one based on an equally efficient entrant.56 7KH $GYRFDWH *HQHUDO¶V 2SLQLRQ LQ
Bronner LVDOVRQRWHZRUWK\LQSRLQWLQJRXWWKDWDOORZLQJDFFHVVWRDFRPSDQ\¶VIDFLOLWLHVWRR
easily would disincentivise both the competitor gaining access and the dominant undertaking 
allowing access from investing in such facilities.57 0RUHRYHUµWKHPHUHIDFWWKDWE\UHWDLQLQJ
a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor 
FDQQRW MXVWLI\ UHTXLULQJ DFFHVV WR LW¶58 Applying Bronner to the facts of Google Search 
suggests that, as comparison shopping sites have many other ways of receiving traffic than 
DSSHDULQJSURPLQHQWO\LQWKHUHVXOWVRQ*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOUHVXOWSDJHVLWFDQQRWEHVDLGWKDW
there are no actual or potential altHUQDWLYHVWR*RRJOH¶VVHUYLFHIRUWKHFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJ
sites to carry on their business. In Google Search, there are both current and potential 
substitutes to receiving (free) traffic from Google Search, such as receiving (free) traffic from 
other search engines, mobile apps, social media or direct (e)mail campaigns, online and 
offline advertising campaigns to increase brand awareness, etc. Furthermore, unlike in 
Bronner where the only home delivery scheme in the country was owned by Mediaprint 
which allHJHGO\ KDG D GRPLQDQW SRVLWLRQ LQ µWKH PDUNHW IRU VHUYLFHV FRQVWLWXWHG E\ WKDW
VFKHPHRURIZKLFKLWIRUPVSDUW¶59 in Google Search there are actual, existing competitors 
RI *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK HQJLQH VXFK DV %LQJ DQG <DKRR ZKLFK KDYH WKHLU RZQ FRPSDULVRQ
                                            
52
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 41. 
53
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 45. 
54
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 42. 
55
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 46. 
56
 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 530. 
57
 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 57. 
58
 AG Jacobs in Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 57. 
59
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 42. 
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shopping features. Thus, the factual context of Google Search is even less likely to require 
the imposition of a duty to deal than the specific factual context of Bronner.  
It has been argued that there are two prongs to the test of indispensability in 
Bronner.60 Petit believes WKDW WKHVH DUH WKH µVXEVWLWXWDELOLW\ SURQJ¶ DQG WKH µUHSOLFDELOLW\
SURQJ¶WKHIRUPHUUHODWHVWRZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHDQ\DOWHUQDWLYHVWRWKHVHUYLFHWRZKLFKDFFHVV
is sought, whereas the latter relates to whether it is economically viable to create an 
alternative service.61 A further argument is that subsequent case law has focussed more on the 
replicability prong rather than the substitutability prong, ZKLFKRFFXSLHVDµPDUJLQDOUROHLQ
thHDVVHVVPHQW¶62 This argument is used to suggest that in the context of Google Search even 
if the substitutability test could be satisfied due to availability of alternative routes to the 
market for comparison shopping sites, it also has to be established that it would be 
µHFRQRPLFDOO\ YLDEOH¶ IRU DQRWKHU XQGHUWDNLQJ WR UHSOLFDWH *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK HQJLQH63 The 
current author respectfully disagrees with the argument that there are two separate prongs to 
indispensability and that later case law has emphasised the replicability prong of Bronner¶V
test. For a start, linguistically, the CoJ does not seem to have introduced separate elements to 
the issue of whether a service is indispensable; the Court has explicitly suggested that 
substitutability is what indispensDELOLW\ PHDQV LQ VWDWLQJ WKDW µWKH VHUYLFH LQ LWVHOI >LV@
LQGLVSHQVDEOH WR FDUU\LQJ RQ WKDW SHUVRQ¶V EXVLQHVV inasmuch as there is no actual or 
SRWHQWLDO VXEVWLWXWH LQ H[LVWHQFH«HPSKDVLV DGGHG¶64 7KHXVHRI WKHZRUGV µLQDVPXFKDV¶
suggests that the second part of the statement explains what the first part of the statement 
means. According to the Court, indispensability is about whether or not there are actual or 
potential substitutes to the service to which access is sought to carry on the business for 
wKLFKDFFHVVLVVRXJKW7KHUHVWRIWKHMXGJPHQWGRHVQRWLQWURGXFHDµUHSOLFDELOLW\SURQJ¶WR
WKH WHVW RI LQGLVSHQVDELOLW\ LW VLPSO\ H[SODLQV ZKDW PLJKW EH µSRWHQWLDO¶ VXEVWLWXWHV DV
                                            
60
 See Petit, supra note 19, at 12-13. 
61
 Petit, supra note 19, at 12. 
62
 Petit, supra note 19, at  3HWLW DOVR VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V *XLGDQFH VLPLODUO\ µFRQILUPV WKH
predominance of the replicability prong in the indispensability WHVW¶ibid, at 13. However, the cited footnote in 
support of this argument is limited to an explanation of what replicability means without any indication that this 
is the more important aspect of indispensability. In fact, in the very same paragraph, the Commission states that 
µ« DQ LQSXW LV LQGLVSHQVDEOH ZKHUH WKHUH LV QR DFWXDO RU SRWHQWLDO VXEVWLWXWH RQ ZKLFK FRPSHWLWRUV LQ WKH
downstream marNHWFRXOGUHO\«¶*XLGDQFHsupra note 26, ¶ 83. Thus, it is clear that also for the Commission 
the key to whether the input is indispensable is substitutability.  
63
 Petit, supra note 19, at 12-13. 
64
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 41. 
17 
 
RSSRVHG WR µDFWXDO¶ VXEVWLWXWHV $IWHU QRWLQJ WKDW µLQ WKH ILUVW SODFH¶ µRWKHU PHWKRGV¶ RI
GLVWULEXWLRQ µH[LVW DQG DUH XVHG¶ LH WKHUH DUH DFWXDO VXEVWLWXWHV65 the Court states that 
µPRUHRYHU¶WKHUHDUHQRWDQ\WHFKQLFDOOHJDORUHFRQRPLFREVWDFOHVWKDWZRXOGSUHYHQWWKH
creation of alternative schemes (ie there are potential substitutes).66 The rest of the relevant 
parts of the judgment explains that this understanding of potential substitutes is based on 
economic viability of creating these for an undertaking that has similar scale to the one 
refusing access and not one that has similar scale to the one seeking access.67 This 
explanation of how to establish the existence of potential substitutes cannot be interpreted to 
suggest that the replicability of the service is a separate prong to the substitutability prong of 
µLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\¶ WKHHQWLUHWHVWRIµLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\¶LQBronner is based on the concept of 
substitutability alone. Regarding Google Search, as there are actual, existing substitutes to 
*RRJOHDIXUWKHULQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWRµUHSOLFDELOLW\¶LVQHLWKHUOHJDOO\UHTXLUHGQRUPHDQLQJIXO 
The case law subsequent to Bronner has not HPSKDVLVHG µUHSOLFDELOLW\¶ LQVWHDG RI
µVXEVWLWXWDELOLW\¶ DV D VHSDUDWH DQG PRUH LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW RI LQGLVSHQVDbility either. In 
European Night Services, one of the subsequent cases cited in this respect,68 the General 
Court (GC) held that a facility cannot be considered necessary or essential unless there is no 
real or potential substitute.69 The reference in European Night Services to the prohibitive cost 
RI UHSURGXFLQJ WKH IDFLOLW\ LV DJDLQ LQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI ZKDW PLJKW FRQVWLWXWH µYLDEOH
DOWHUQDWLYHV DYDLODEOH WR SRWHQWLDO FRPSHWLWRUV¶ LQ WHUPV RI H[SODLQLQJ µVXEVWLWXWDELOLW\¶70 
Microsoft and IMS Health are the two RWKHU FDVHV FLWHG LQ VXSSRUW RI µUHSOLFDELOLW\¶ EHLQJ
PRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQµVXEVWLWXWDELOLW\¶71 The argument is that in Microsoft the GC ruled that 
WKHNH\TXHVWLRQLQWKHLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\WHVWZDVWKHµHFRQRPLFYLDELOLW\¶RIULYDOFRPSDQLHV72 
However, in Microsoft WKHFLWHGUHIHUHQFHWRµHFRQRPLFYLDELOLW\¶DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQPDGH
not in the context of the economic viability of replicating the product/service to which access 
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 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 43. 
66
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶ 44. 
67
 Bronner, supra note 51, ¶¶ 45-46. 
68
 Petit, supra note 19, at 13.  
69
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is sought, but the economic viability of rivals as businesses if the sought access is not 
provided.73 These are two different issues and Bronner DOUHDG\QRWHGWKDW µLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\¶
related to the indispensability of the access µWRFDUU\RQWKDWSHUVRQ¶V>LHWKHSHUVRQVHHNLQJ
DFFHVV@EXVLQHVV¶74 In fact, there was no factual point about replicability in Microsoft since 
the refusal to deal aspect of the case concerned disclosure of interoperability information 
which the rivals on the work group server operating systems market needed and replicability 
of client PC operating systems (ie the market over which Microsoft was dominant) was never 
an issue in the case. The question was whether there were alternatives (ie substitutes) to 
0LFURVRIW¶V GLVFORVXUH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG KDYH HQDEOHG WKH ULYDOV WR UHPDLQ
economically viable on the server market.75 Thus, Microsoft does not appear to have 
emphasised the replicability of the service over the substitutability of the service, not least 
because the factual issue related to substitutability. Similarly, in IMS Health, 
µLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\¶ DJDin seems to have been expressed only in terms of the existence of 
substitutes (actual or potential) rather than through a distinction between substitutability and 
replicability of the service to which access is sought.76 Furthermore, in a factual scenario as 
in Google Search where there are already actual substitutes to the service to which access is 
sought, logically, there would be no need to consider whether the service could be replicated 
since the existence of actual alternatives makes that inquiry into potential alternatives 
redundant. 
Regarding the abuse of refusal to supply and the application of the case law to the 
facts of Google Search, a key issue is indeed the indispensability of the input that Google 
allegedly provides to websites such as comparison shopping sites. It has been noted that 
vertical foreclosure and the consequent duty to be imposed to assist rivals may only be 
justified when the dominant undertaking controls an indispensable input that cannot be 
replicated.77 In terms of indispensability of Google Search or a certain type or position of 
display on the general result pages for comparison shopping sites, some commentators have 
suggested that it is possible to conceive Google Search as an indispensable distribution tool, a 
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µVRUWRIHVVHQWLDOIDFLOLW\¶WRZKLFKFRPSHWLQJVSHFLDOLVWVHDUFKHQJLQHVDQGZHEVLWHVVKRXOG
have access.78 7KH\QRWHWKDW*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKHQJLQHKDVDFRVWVWUXFWXUHWKDWUHVHPEOHVWKDW
of natural monopolies (important fixed costs and low marginal costs), making it theoretically 
possible for a plaintiff to prove that creating a search engine is not a realistic potential 
alternative and that access to the existing system is therefore indispensable in the sense of 
Bronner.79 However, the same commentators also remark that such evidence will be 
particularly difficult to produce and require concrete empirical analysis.80 Moreover, the 
theory of the search engine being a natural monopoly and providing an indispensable output 
without substitutes is directly challenged by the existence of competitors of Google providing 
search engines such as Bing, Yahoo!, DuckDuckGo and some local competitors such as 
Yandex, etc.  
For some, for example, the German Monopolies Commission, it is doubtful whether 
VHDUFKHQJLQHVPHHWWKHOHJDOSUHUHTXLVLWHVRIDQµHVVHQWLDOIDFLOLW\¶81 Arguably, regardless of 
its market share, a single search engine is unlikely to constitute an essential facility if there 
are alternative search engines making it possible to find websites.82 Content which does not 
appear at the top of the search results remains accessible for internet users, as a matter of 
principle, via other channels; this suggests that a search engine is neither an essential facility 
nor a gatekeeper.83 Even if network effects were a relevant consideration due to, for example, 
enabling Google to offer the best services among search engines as a result of performing the 
largest number of search queries, Google is still subject to competitive pressure from other 
search engines: the latter would immediately exploit any shortcomings of Google in order to 
attract users and reduce the degree to which they lag behind Google.84 User behaviour also 
suggests that individual search engines do not act as gatekeepers of the internet since well-
                                            
78
 Lianos and Motchenkova, supra note 19, at 434. See also Mays, supra note 24, at 751 et seq arguing that 
Google Search should be regulated as an essential facility. 
79
 Lianos and Motchenkova, supra note 19, at 435. 
80
 Lianos and Motchenkova, supra note 19, at 435. 
81
 *HUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶n, Competition Policy: The Challenge of Digital Markets, Special Report No. 68, 
at 58 (2015)  http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s68_fulltext_eng.pdf. 
82
 GeUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶Qsupra note 81, at 58. 
83
 *HUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶n, supra note 81, at 61. 
84
 *HUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶n, supra note 81, at 59. 
20 
 
known websites (in Germany) with a large share of internet traffic do not rely on search 
engines as they are navigated to directly.85  
Other commentators argue that even if one assumed that Google simply refused to list 
WKH FRPSHWLWRU¶V EXVLQHVV LQ WKH RUJDQLF VHDUFK UHVXOWV FRQVLGHULQJ D SRWHQWLDO YHUWLFDO
IRUHFORVXUH WKHRU\ WKH RQO\ LPSDFW WKDW *RRJOH¶V FRQGXFW ZRXOG KDYH RQ WKH unaffiliated 
competitor would be to deprive it of a particular source of free promotion.86 There is no need 
WRFRQVLGHUWKHDQWLWUXVW LPSOLFDWLRQVRI*RRJOH¶VRUJDQLFUHVXOWVEHLQJWKHRQO\PHFKDQLVP
by which competitors in the vertical-search relevant market could promote their businesses 
because that is counterfactual.87 Thus, while the assumed refusal to deal by Google may hurt 
the excluded competitor, it is difficult to conceive how the assumed refusal to deal would 
KDUP WKH XQDIILOLDWHG FRPSHWLWRU¶V DELlity to compete or harm competition in the assumed 
vertical search-relevant market.88  
All in all, neither the provision of free traffic by Google nor certain display conditions 
relating to the general result pages can be deemed to be indispensable for operating a website 
such as a comparison shopping site given the alternatives available for both of these potential 
inputs. 
b. Refusal to provide access to intangible property including property 
protected by IP rights 
Other than cases concerning refusal to provide (access to) physical property, there are also 
FDVHV WKDWKDYHFRQFHUQHGDGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶V UHIXVDO WRSURYLGH DFFHVV WR LQWDQJLEOH
property including property that is protected by IP rights. Given that the input in question in 
Google Search does not concern physical property, this line of case law is more relevant to 
the application of a refusal to deal theory in Google Search.  
An early case concerning access to intangible property is Télémarketing, where the 
CoJ found that the ruling in Commercial Solvents also applies to an undertaking holding a 
dominant position on the market in a service which is indispensable for the activities of 
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another undertaking on another market.89 This case concerned the TV broadcaster holding a 
legal monopoly in Luxembourg for running the RTL TV station refusing to sell CBEM (a 
telemarketing company) television time on RTL for telephone marketing operations using a 
WHOHSKRQHQXPEHURWKHUWKDQWKDWRI57/¶VH[FOXVLYHDJHQWIRU79DGYHUWLVLQJ90 The Court 
held that if, telemarketing activities constitute a separate market from that of television 
advertising, and if telemarketing activities mainly consist in making available to advertisers 
the telephone lines and telephonists of the telemarketing undertaking, to subject the sale of 
broadcasting time to the condition that the telephone lines of an advertising agent belonging 
to the same group as the TV station should be used amounts in practice to a refusal to supply 
the services of that station to any other telemarketing undertaking.91 If that refusal is not 
justified by technical or commercial requirements relating to the nature of the television, but 
it is intended to reserve to the agent any telemarketing operation broadcast by the station, 
with the possibility of eliminating all competition from another undertaking, such conduct 
amounts to an abuse under Article 102TFEU, provided that the other conditions of that 
provision are satisfied.92 Thus, the Court held that it is an abuse where, without any objective 
necessity, an undertaking dominant on a particular market reserves to itself or to an affiliated 
undertaking an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of 
its activities in a neighbouring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all 
competition from such undertaking.93  
Applying the findings of Télémarketing to Google Search reveals that the facts are too 
different to make the conduct in Google Search abusive under Télémarketing. Other than it 
being questionable whether comparison shopping constitutes a separate market in itself, the 
dispute in Télémarketing ultimately involved contractual tying (in the manner of a 
constructive refusal to supply) since RTL tied the supply of advertising time on TV to the 
FRQGLWLRQ WKDW WKH 79 FRPSDQ\¶V RZQ WHOHPDUNHWLQJ DJHQF\ ZDV XVHG ,Q Google Search 
there is no such (contractual) tying (ie there is no supplementary obligation imposed on 
FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ VLWHV IRU WKHLU ZHEVLWHV WR EH GLVSOD\HG LQ *RRJOH¶V JHQHUDO UHVXOW
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pages). There is also no legal (or factual) monopoly unlike in Télémarketing. More 
importantly, the ratio of the case is not applicable to the facts in Google Search since that 
ratio involves an undertaking holding a monopoly on the market in a service which is 
indispensable for the activities of another undertaking on another market reserving to itself 
an ancillary activity with the possibility of eliminating all competition from another 
undertaking which could carry out that activity without objective necessity and without 
technical or commercial justifications.94 $VQRWHGDERYH*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKHQJLQHFDQQRWEH
deemed indispensable to provide comparison shopping services since a website providing 
such services can technically and commercially be started and operated with no input from 
Google or its search engine. Similarly, Google could not reserve to itself the ancillary activity 
of comparison shopping since technically ± unlike in Télémarketing ± it cannot stop any users 
from visiting the comparison shopping sites just like it cannot prevent any other website from 
entering the alleged comparison shopping market. The fact that (free) traffic from Google 
Search might make a given site more profitable cannot in itself imply that Google Search is 
indispensable to operate that site with the implication that if Google does not provide such 
traffic, it would mean that it reserves to itself that separate activity. As noted above, in 
European Night Services, the GC held, in the context of essential facilities, that a facility 
cannot be considered necessary or essential unless there is no real or potential substitute.95 In 
other words, mere advantage to the competitor is not enough.96 Furthermore, objective 
necessity as well as technical or commercial justifications have been provided by the CoJ as 
grounds which would render the conduct legitimate. In Google Search, the technical and 
commercial nature of the services of a search engine involves the ranking of search results on 
WKHEDVLVRIUHOHYDQFHDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHVHDUFKHQJLQH¶VDOJRULWKP7KLVVXJJHVWV WKDW LI
certain websites do not appear in certain rankings which are occupied instead by other 
websites in the general result pages because they are more relevant to a query, this in itself 
can constitute a justification, even a necessity since it is necessary to rank results and there 
can only be one link to one website displayed in a given ranking in the results.  
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The case law on refusal to supply also involves cases dealing with refusal to supply 
access to intangible property/services that are protected by IP rights. A number of 
commentators have suggested that Google Search is not an IP-related case.97 For some 
authors, this means that these cases are irrelevant,98 whereas for others, all cases involving 
refusal to deal should be subject to the higher intervention threshold established in cases 
concerning IP-related cases since the rationale that justifies the threshold to be high is 
similarly applicable to all types of property.99 The current author posits that Google Search is 
not necessarily a case outside the realm of the case law concerning refusal to deal in IP-
protected property/services, for the following reasons.  
Despite the fact that the complainants or the Commission are not seeking the 
GLVFORVXUHRI*RRJOH¶VDOJRULWKPLQGoogle Search, the case can still be deemed to fall within 
the scope of the refusal to deal case law concerning IP rights. This is because although in 
Google Search the remedy sought may not be the compulsory disclosure or licensing of a 
product/service protected by IP rights, the alleged abuse and the remedy sought concern the 
conditions of access to a product/service aspects of which are protected by IP rights. This is 
because the claim is that Google diverts traffic in its general search results from comparison 
shopping sites to its own comparison shopping service. This alleged diversion allegedly 
RFFXUVWKURXJKWKHXVHRI*RRJOH¶VDOJRULWKPVLQFHWKHUHVXOWVGLVSOD\HGDUHJHQHUDWHGE\WKH
algorithP &HUWDLQ DVSHFWV RI *RRJOH¶V DOJRULWKP DUH SDWHQW-protected and some have 
suggested that the entire algorithm itself may be patent-protected as a process.100 Moreover, 
the algorithm may be copyright-protected as a computer program.101 Furthermore, the remedy 
VRXJKWFRQFHUQVFRQGLWLRQVRIULYDOV¶DFFHVVWR*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOVHDUFKUHVXOWSDJHVUHJDUGLQJ
display, ranking, etc. These pages are again the outcome of the application by Google of its 
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algorithm to a given query. A comparison with Microsoft further reveals the relevance of the 
case law concerning IP-related refusals to deal for Google Search. 
In Microsoft the access sought never concerned the compulsory disclosure of the 
source code for the Windows Operating System (OS), but the case was still dealt with as a 
case concerning IP rights.102 By analogy, the algorithm of Google Search can be deemed to 
be the equivalent of the code for Windows OS. In Microsoft, the abusive refusal to deal 
concerned the refusal to provide interoperability information by Microsoft (which held a 
virtual monopoly in the market for client PC operating systems) to its rivals on the separate 
market for work group operating systems.103 Consequently, if in Microsoft the interface 
information that enabled interoperability beWZHHQ 0LFURVRIW¶V RSHUDWLQJ V\VWHP DQG
FRPSHWLWRUV¶ RSHUDWLQJ V\VWHPV ZDV GHHPHG WR EH SURWHFWHG E\ FRS\ULJKW LW LV DW OHDVW
DUJXDEOH WKDW WKH UHVXOWVRI WKH DSSOLFDWLRQRI *RRJOH¶V DOJRULWKP WR DTXHU\ ± which have 
EHHQKHOG WREHDQ µRSLQLRQ¶SURWHFWHGby the First Amendment by some US courts ± may 
similarly be protected by IP rights (eg copyright).104 If there is any possibility that IP rights 
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are involved in Google Search, then similar to Microsoft, the Commission and EU Courts 
would have to treat the case as one involving IP rights since this would be the most 
favourable interpretation to Google. In Microsoft it was indeed questionable whether the 
interface information was copyright protected, but it was assumed that it was and the 
Commission and the GC both took their decisions accordingly, because this interpretation 
was more favourable to Microsoft than the alternative.105 Thus, it is not necessary for the 
remedy sought to be the disclosure of the algorithm for Google Search to be treated as a case 
concerning IP rights. Therefore, one can argue that the applicable refusal to deal case law in 
Google Search is that concerning refusal to provide access to IP-protected products/services, 
with its higher threshold for intervention. This article will now consider this line of case law. 
Across various cases, the EU Courts have established the conditions under which 
refusals to supply IP-protected products/services may be abusive. This jurisprudence first 
VXJJHVWVWKDWRQO\LQµH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶FRXOGWKHH[HUFLVHRIDQH[FOXVLYHULJKWHJ
WKHH[HUFLVHRIXVLQJ*RRJOH¶VDOJRULWKPLQYROYHDEXVLYHFRQGXFW106 In IMS Health the CoJ 
clarified that, for the refusal by an undertaking which owns an IP right to give access to a 
product/service indispensable for carrying on a particular business to be treated as abusive, 
three cumulative conditions must be satisfied: (i) that refusal prevents the emergence of a 
new product for which there is a potential consumer demand; (ii) the refusal is unjustified, 
and (iii) the refusal excludes any competition on a secondary market.107 As regards condition 
(i), the CoJ held that where the product/service to which access is sought is indispensable to 
operate on a separate market, the refusal to provide that access may only be abusive if the 
undertaking requesting access does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the 
products/services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the IP right, but 
intends to produce new products/services not offered by the owner of the right and for which 
there is a potential consumer demand.108 Regarding condition (iii), in Microsoft, the GC held 
that this meant not the elimination of all competition, but the elimination of all effective 
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competition.109 This has been suggested to be a response to earlier developments of the case 
law which had inhibited the applicability of the essential facilities doctrine since the 
requirement of eliminating all competition is a more demanding one than the requirement of 
eliminating effective competition.110 Although the substance of this interpretation may be 
correct on the basis of the wording of the judgment in Microsoft, it is noteworthy that 
Microsoft is a judgment of the GC whilst the cases stipulating the requirement to be that of 
eliminating all competition involve judgments of the CoJ.111 Thus, had the Microsoft 
MXGJPHQWEHHQDSSHDOHGWKH&R-PD\KDYHKDGDQLVVXHZLWKWKH*&¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZLWKRXW
a recent judgment of the CoJ after Microsoft the law on this requirement ultimately remains 
debatable. It is also noteworthy that the GC in Microsoft GRHV QRW XVH µHVVHQWLDO IDFLOLWLHV¶
terminology. Moreover, it has been argued that in Microsoft the GC appeared to suggest that 
the criteria in Magill and IMS Health were satisfied anyway since the non-disclosure of 
interoperability information was likely to prevent new and innovative products from 
emerging and to eliminate effective competition.112 In Microsoft the GC also provided an 
interpretation of the requirement that the refusal to deal prevents the emergence of a new 
product as stipulated in Magill and IMS Health that goes beyond the stipulations of the CoJ in 
these cases. The GC in Microsoft held that this could not be the only parameter which 
determines whether the refusal is capable of prejudicing the interests of consumers since that 
can also be the case where the refusal limits technical development.113 Again, this finding has 
not been challenged before the CoJ and in any case does acknowledge that the relevant 
criterion is whether or not there is damage to the interests of consumers.114 
One commentator has argued that to prove that Google is abusing its position due to a 
refusal to supply, it would have to be proven that: (i) achieving a certain ranking and/or being 
displayed in a certain way in Google Search is indispensable to compete effectively; (ii) 
Google lowers the ranking of competitors in searches or manipulates the way in which they 
are displayed in search results to their detriment, in a way that cannot be justified as being 
UHVSRQVLYH WR XVHUV¶ TXHULHV LLL DV D UHVXOW RI WKH FRQGXFW all effective competition in 
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specialist (vertical) searches is likely to be eliminated; (iv) users are consequently harmed in 
WKDW WKH TXDOLW\ RI VHDUFK UHVXOWV DQG XVHUV¶ H[SHULHQFH DUH PDWHULDOO\ ZRUVH WKDQ LW ZRXOG
otherwise be the case.115 To this list of conditions, the current author would add that if the 
conduct in Google Search is to be treated as a refusal to supply, then the Commission would 
also have to prove that this refusal prevents the emergence of a new product/service for 
which there is potential consumer demand and the rivals seeking access do not intend to limit 
themselves essentially to duplicating the products/services already offered on the secondary 
market by the dominant undertaking. In Google Search this would require proving that the 
FRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHVVHHNLQJFHUWDLQGLVSOD\DQGDFFHVVFRQGLWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJ*RRJOH¶V
search result pages are intending to provide new services (eg new websites; websites with 
new features, etc) for which there is potential consumer demand and that are not currently 
already provided by the dominant undertaking. It is highly debatable whether this can be 
satisfied on the facts in Google Search, particularly in the presence of merchant platforms 
such as Amazon that already offer arguably more convenient and attractive alternatives to 
consumers for product search. In this context, it is also noteworthy that the Commission in its 
Guidance on Enforcement Priorities has expanded the use of the criterion whether the refusal 
prevents the emergence of a new product/service for which there is potential consumer 
demand to all cases of refusal to supply as part of the assessment of whether the refusal 
causes consumer harm.116 Therefore, even if it were held that Google Search does not involve 
any IP rights, this condition still remains an important part of the assessment of abuse, at least 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRZQH[SUHVVLRQVRILWVDSSURDFKWR$UWLFOHTFEU. As the 
facts in Google Search are unlikely to support the finding of an indispensable input which the 
rivals are seeking to introduce a new product/service for which there is potential consumer 
demand, the abuse of refusal to supply cannot be established under the existing case law.   
c. Estoppel abuse 
6RPHFRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHGLVFXVVHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHUHEHLQJDQµHVWRSSHODEXVH¶LQWKH
context of the dealings of a dominant undertaking with others.117 The suggestion is that in 
                                            
115
 Nazzini, supra note 19, at 310. 
116
 See Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 87. 
117
 See Kevin Coates, The Estoppel Abuse (Oct. 28, 2013), 21st Century Competition Blog, 
http://www.twentyfirstcenturycompetition.com/2013/10/the-estoppel-abuse/; Petit, supra note 19, at 8. 
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cases where the dominant undertaking does not have a duty to deal, it is not sensible to argue 
that there should nevertheless be certain terms of supply or that the terms of supply can be 
abusive. However, one could still suggest, so the argument goes, that once the dominant 
undertaking has unilaterally chosen to supply, it must supply on terms that would make it at 
least possible to compete. This LVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIµHVWRSSHO¶VLQFHWKHSUHPLVHLVWKDWWKH
customer will have taken certain commercial decisions relying on the existing offer of supply 
and such reliance should be protected.118 This approach has been interpreted as a possible 
reading of TeliaSonera which, according to some, has vacated the requirements of the case 
law on refusal to deal (including indispensability or the essential nature of the facility to 
which access is sought).119 However, with respect, it is difficult to understand how 
TeliaSonera might be relevant for the interpretation of indispensability in the context of 
refusal to deal, if this is what is being suggested by commentators. Whatever the merits of the 
judgment in TeliaSonera WKH &RXUW¶V ILQGLQJV Uelate to a margin squeeze abuse and not a 
refusal to supply. The only relevance of refusal to deal for TeliaSonera LVWKH&RXUW¶VILQGLQJ
that for margin squeeze to be abusive, it is not necessary that the dominant undertaking has a 
duty to supply the product/service (the price of which leads to squeezing the margins of the 
GRZQVWUHDPFRPSHWLWRUV LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH ,QRWKHUZRUGVPDUJLQ VTXHH]H µPD\ LQ LWVHOI
FRQVWLWXWHDQLQGHSHQGHQWIRUPRIDEXVHGLVWLQFWIURPWKDWRIUHIXVDOWRVXSSO\¶120 It follows 
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 7KHFRQFHSWRIµHVWRSSHO¶UHODWHVWRDSHUVRQEHLQJSUHYHQWHGRUµHVWRSSHG¶IURPJRLQJEDFNRQDSURPLVH
representation or assumption; see ROGER HALSON, CONTRACT LAW 176 (2nd ed. 2013). The equitable doctrine 
of estoppel covers different types of estoppel such as estoppel by convention, proprietary estoppel and 
promissory estoppel; ibid.  
119
 See Petit, supra note 19, at 7-3HWLWDUJXHVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VUHIXWDWLRQRIWKHHVVHQWLDOIDFLOLWLHVWKUHVKROGLQ
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527 is not strictly confined to 
margin squeeze cases; ibid 8. See also Lianos and Motchenkova, supra note 19, at 435 suggesting that after 
TeliaSoneraSURYLQJWKHµLQGLVSHQVDELOLW\¶RIDFFHVVWRWKHLQSXWFRQWUROOHGE\WKHGRPLQDQWFRPSDQ\PLJKWQRW
be such a difficult condition to fulfil and it might not even be required for the application of Article 102TFEU to 
discriminatory practices of a dominant undertaking. Lianos and Motchenkova argue that the indispensability 
condition does not work outside a clear refusal to deal framework and it seems unclear hRZ*RRJOH¶VSUDFWLFHV
might be qualified as a refusal to deal since Google does not refuse to provide access to its search engine, but 
arguably RQO\ DYRLGV OLVWLQJ YHUWLFDO FRPSHWLWRUV¶ at the first positions in the ranking; ibid at 436. See also 
Nazzini who suggests that TeliaSonera is relevant ± and wrong ± regarding the condition of indispensability; 
Nazzini, supra note 19, at 309.  
120
 TeliaSonera, supra note 119, ¶ 56. This is in contrast to the US Supreme Court judgment in Linkline which 
found that for margin squeeze to be abusive, first there must be an antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiff at 
wholesale and, second, the price at retail level must be predatory; Pacific Bell Telephone Co,  AT&T California 
v Linkline Communications Inc, 555 US 438 (2009). See also Verizon Communications Inc v  Law Offices of 
Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398 (2004), which previously established that where there is no antitrust duty to 
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that if a duty to supply the product/service in question is not necessary for the relevant prices 
to constitute abusive margin squeeze, argumentum a fortiori it is not relevant whether the 
input sought is indispensable or essential since this is only a relevant concern if the abuse is 
that of refusal to deal. This does not imply that indispensability of the input is no longer 
necessary for cases concerning refusal to supply since a judgment that explicitly states that 
the case is not about refusal to deal cannot be interpreted to have changed the conditions 
established in the case law concerning refusal to deal. The judgment in TeliaSonera that 
margin squeeze is an abuse independent of refusal to supply is a reflection of the 
interpretation that margin squeeze is an abuse that falls under Article 102(a)TFEU which 
explicitly prohibits the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions.121 This author is not aware of any interpretation of Article 102(a)TFEU that 
suggested that before a price could be deemed unfair for being, for example, excessive, or 
EHIRUH D FRQWUDFW FODXVH FRXOG EH µXQIDLU¶ LW KDV WR EH HVWDEOLVKHG WKDW WKH GRPLQDQW
undertaking had a duty to supply the product/service or a duty to enter into a contract in the 
first place. Article 102(a)TFEU occupies itself with the terms and conditions of the dealings 
of a dominant undertaking with its customers and suppliers as an exploitative abuse 
irrespective of whether there is a duty to enter into a contract on the part of the dominant 
undertaking.122 TeliaSonera simply explains that this is the case also for margin squeeze 
without any implications for the requirements of refusal to deal as a separate abuse from 
margin squeeze.  
Regarding Google Search DGRSWLQJ VXFK DQ DSSURDFK RI µHVWRSSHO¶ DEXVH ZRXOG
imply that Google could never innovate and improve its service to users, namely the 
provision of relevant results IRU D VHDUFK TXHU\ ,I D JLYHQ ZHEVLWH DSSHDUV RQ *RRJOH¶V
general result pages at a given ranking in response to a given query and this creates reliance 
on the part of that website (eg reliance that there will be a certain amount of traffic to that 
website, etc), then Google would be bound to display the same set of results in response to 
                                                                                                                                       
deal with competitors at wholesale, there is no duty to deal under terms and conditions that the rivals find 
commercially advantageous. 
121
 See TeliaSonera, supra note 119, ¶ 25 as also noted by Petit, supra note 19, at 8. 
122
 This author has argued elsewhere that for exploitation to be prohibited under Article 102TFEU it should also 
be the case that the exploitation leads to the exclusion of an as efficient undertaking since otherwise, it is unclear 
what the harm to competition is from pure exploitation of customers; see AKMAN, supra note 23, at 307-316. 
Thus, margin squeeze should be both exploitative and exclusionary for it to be considered abusive.  
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the same query indefinitely. This clearly goes against the business model of a search engine 
which regularly updates its algorithm to provide better results to users and would be a huge 
impediment to innovation that would ultimately constitute a detriment to consumers. 
Establishing a duty on the part of Google to supply a service to certain websites could open 
up the possibility of creating such an estoppel abuse which would bring to a halt any 
innovation that could increase choice and any improvement in existing technologies for the 
sake of protecting the interests of certain undertakings. It should, therefore, be avoided. 
d. Objective Justification 
AQ µREMHFWLYH MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ SURYLGHG E\ D GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ IRU DQ DOOHJHGO\ DEXVLYH
conduct can prevent the finding of an infringement under Article 102TFEU.123 Such objective 
MXVWLILFDWLRQFDQ WDNH WKHIRUPRISURYLQJ WKDW WKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VFonduct is either 
objectively necessary or is justified due to the efficiencies that it produces which 
counterbalance or outweigh any anticompetitive effects and also benefit consumers.124 
Although commentators have argued that any such justifications should be taken into account 
E\ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ EHIRUH D ILQGLQJ RI DEXVH LV PDGH UDWKHU WKDQ FRQVWLWXWH D µGHIHQFH¶
currently, the burden to prove an objective justification by providing all the necessary 
evidence is on the dominant undertaking.125 &RQVHTXHQWO\µit is for the dominant undertaking 
to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration 
counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected 
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 On objective justification, see eg Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
&RPP¶n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 184; Télémarketing, supra note 89, ¶ 27; Case C-95/04P, British Airways v 
&RPP¶n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶¶ 69, 86.  
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 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrenceradet, Mar. 27, 2012, EU:C:2012:172, ¶ 41; British 
Airways, supra note 123, ¶ 86; TeliaSonera, supra note 119, ¶ 76; Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 28.  
125
 Post Danmark I, supra note 124, ¶ 42. In the context of enforcement at EU level, the Commission would 
make the ultimate assessment of whether the conduct is not objectively necessary or whether the anticompetitive 
effects outweigh any efficiencies; Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 31. For the argument that any efficiencies and 
other justifications should be taken into consideration before a finding of abuse is made, see eg Pinar Akman, 
Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 288-289 (2009); Denis 
Waelbroeck, 7KH$VVHVVPHQWRI(IILFLHQFLHVXQGHU$UWLFOH7)(8DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGDQFH3DSHU, in 
COMPETITION LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 102 115, 121-122 (Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris 
eds, 2010); AKMAN, supra note 23, at 282-283 and 316 et seq; 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 
3DUWRIWKHSUREOHPZLWKDFFHSWLQJHIILFLHQFLHVWREHDQµREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHIRUHDGHIHQFHLV
that, as expressed by Advocate General Jacobs in Syfait, the two-stage analysis suggested by the distinction 
EHWZHHQµDEXVH¶DQGµREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶LVVRPHZKDWDUWLILFLDOWKHPRUHDFFXUDWHYLHZLVWKDWµFHUWDLQW\SHs 
RIFRQGXFWRQWKHSDUWRIDGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJGRQRWIDOOZLWKLQWKHFDWHJRU\RIDEXVHDWDOO¶see AG Jacobs 
Opinion in Case 53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. I-4609,  ¶ 72. 
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markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a result of that 
conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in efficiency and 
that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of 
DFWXDORUSRWHQWLDOFRPSHWLWLRQ¶126 
As with all categories of abuse, even if there was a refusal to deal with competitors in 
Google Search, a defence of objective justification would still be available. In fact, in IMS 
Health the CoJ held that the finding of refusal not being justified is one of the cumulative 
conditions that has to be satisfied before the refusal can be found abusive in the first place.127 
In Google Search it is in the nature of the search engine business model to list results and to 
rank them applying a particular algorithm. Thus, one can argue that if certain websites are not 
GLVSOD\HGRUUDQNHGLQFHUWDLQZD\VDVDUHVXOWRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI*RRJOH¶VDOJRULWKPWKHQ
provided that, for example, there is no arbitrary non-inclusion on the web index or deletion of 
a website from the index where inclusion was technically possible and customary,128 the 
business model itself justifies the fact that not every site is displayed equally in the results 
since this is neither technically possible nor desirable. Consequently, the conduct can satisfy 
both the requirement of being objectively necessary and also generating efficiencies due to 
the nature of the business model of a search engine. In fact, WKH)7&KDVIRXQGWKDW*RRJOH¶V
µSURPLQHQW GLVSOD\ RI LWV RZQ YHUWLFDO VHDUFK UHVXOWV¶ KDG WKH SULPDU\ JRDO RI TXLFNO\
DQVZHULQJ DQG EHWWHU VDWLVI\LQJ µLWV XVHUV¶ VHDUFK TXHULHV E\ SURYLGLQJ GLUHFWO\ UHOHYDQW
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶129 According to the FTC, the evidence that it examined is largely consistent 
with the conclusion that Google likely benefitted consumers by prominently displaying its 
specialist (vertical) content.130 7KLVLVVXSSRUWHGE\HYLGHQFHRQ)7&¶VILOHWKDW*RRJOHZRXOG
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 Post Danmark I, supra note 124, ¶ 42. See also Guidance, supra note 26, ¶ 30. This author has previously 
argued that this position of the EU Courts and the Commission essentially involves a reversal of the burden of 
proving abuse in cases where the Commission has not proven harm to consumers/consumer welfare as it 
requires the dominant undertaking to rebut a position that the Commission has not established (ie the existence 
of harm to consumers/consumer welfare, which is not necessary for a finding of abuse by the Commission) in 
the process of trying to establish that efficiencies are a valid justification because they benefit consumers; Pinar 
Akman, 7KH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V *XLGDQFH RQ $UWLFOH 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?, 73 (4) 
MODERN L. REV. 605, 621 (2010). 
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 IMS Health, supra note 76, ¶ 38. 
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 See GeUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶Qsupra note 81, at 61 for the example. 
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 Statement of WKH)HGHUDO7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQ5HJDUGLQJ*RRJOH¶V6HDUFK3UDFWLFHV In the Matter of Google 
Inc, FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), 2 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. 
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 FTC Statement, supra note 129, at 2. 
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typically test, monitor, and carefully consider the effect of introducing its specialist (vertical) 
content on the quality of its general search results and demote its own content to a less 
prominent location when a higher ranking adversely affected the user experience.131 The 
German Monopolies Commission appears to share the same view as the FTC. For it, the 
inclusion of specialised services in the results of a horizontal search constitutes a refining of 
the search platform and is therefore a product innovation, not least because many search 
queries cannot be sensibly answered until other services are incorporated in this way.132 The 
VHDUFKSODWIRUP¶VDGGLWLRQDOIXQFWLRQVQRWRQO\PDNHLWPRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRXVHUVLWDOVRRIIHUV
users added value if relevant content is shown directly, allowing the user to avoid 
inconvenient further searches on other websites.133 
Finally, the conduct does not eliminate effective competition either. Both merchant 
platform sites like Amazon and the sites of retailers which carry the product in a given 
product search as well as comparison shopping sites appear in the organic results on Google 
Search in addition to relevant sponsored links from any sites which have purchased 
advertisements to display in the ad space on the result pages in response to a search for that 
item. All of these sites are also accessible by navigating to their websites without the need to 
conduct a search for them on Google, which is an additional factor that supports the finding 
that effective competition is not eliminated.  
 
B. Discrimination 
7KH VHFRQG W\SHRI DEXVH WKDWPLJKWXQGHUOLH WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V WKHRU\ RIKDUP LQ Google 
Search LV GLVFULPLQDWLRQ 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V DOOHJDWLRQV RI µVHOI-SUHIHUHQFLQJ¶ RU µVHOI-
IDYRXULQJ¶ suggests an argument that Google abuses its alleged dominant position by 
HQJDJLQJLQGLVFULPLQDWRU\FRQGXFW,PSOLFLWLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVWDWHPHQWVLVDQDUJXPHQW
that Google treats its own comparison shopping service more favourably and thus differently 
in comparison to how it treats rival comparison shopping services regarding display of results 
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 FTC Statement, supra note 129, at 2. 
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 German MonopoOLHV&RPP¶Qsupra note 81, at 62. 
133
 GeUPDQ0RQRSROLHV&RPP¶Qsupra note 81, at 62. 
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and application of penalties, and this can be remedied by the equal treatment of Google 
Shopping and rival comparison shopping sites by Google.134  
$FFRUGLQJ WR $UWLFOH F7)(8 DEXVH PD\ FRQVLVW LQ µDSSO\LQJ GLVVLPLODU
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
FRPSHWLWLYHGLVDGYDQWDJH¶Discrimination requires ± by definition ± there to be (at least) two 
distinct transactions that are treated dissimilarly (similarly) albeit being equivalent (non-
equivalent).135 Although the list of practices in Article 102TFEU is not exhaustive and the 
CoJ has in the past, in the context of tying, applied Article 102(d)TFEU to a situation which 
was clearly excluded by the wording of that provision on the basis of the list not being 
exhaustive, where the practice in question is one of the practices listed in Article 102TFEU 
itself, the normal practice for the EU Courts and the Commission would be to base their 
interpretation of that particular prohibition on the provision itself.136 If the alleged abuse is 
discrimination, then not complying with the conditions found in Article 102(c)TFEU that 
stipulate when discrimination can be abusive, would potentially breach the principle of legal 
certainty, a fundamental principle of EU law.137 For this reason, one must examine the 
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 See Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
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 For discrimination covering the treatment of non-equivalent transactions similarly, see Case 13/63, Italy v 
&RPP¶n, 1963 E.C.R. 165, ¶ 6. 
136
 This author has argued elsewhere that where the practice in question is explicitly prohibited as an abuse in 
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the wording of the prohibition itself; see Pinar Akman, Article 82 Reformed? The EC Discussion Paper on 
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 On legal certainty being a fundamental principle of EU law, see eg Case C-94/05, Emsland-Staerke GmbH v 
Landwirtschaftskammer Hannover, 2006 E.C.R. I-2619, ¶ 43 and the cases cited therein; Case C-201/08, 
Plantanol GmbH & Co KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, 2009 E.C.R. I-08343, ¶ 46; Case 348/85, Kingdom of 
'HQPDUNY&RPP¶n, 1987 E.C.R. 5225, ¶ 19. Moreover, the list of practices in Article 102TFEU would lose all 
meaning as examples of abusive practices if they are not even applicable as stipulated in cases where the 
conduct in question is listed in the provision in terms of the requirements for it to be abusive. Such an 
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difficult to defend even under a teleological approach since concerning discrimination, like the other examples 
in Article 102(2)TFEU, the drafters of the Treaty have expressly indicated the requirements and scope of the 
operation of that prohibition, meaning that there is no gap to which the Court/Commission could extend the 
application of Article 102TFEU using a teleological approach. The EU Courts usually favour the teleological 
method of interpreting the Treaty rules; see eg David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community 
Competition Law?, 35 HARV. INT¶L L. J. 97, 109, 116±7 (1994). The teleological approach enables the court to 
extend the statutory provisions to situations that were not contemplated at the time of enactment, thereby 
HQVXULQJ WKH FRGH¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ WR FKDQJLQJ VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF FRQGLWLRQV *erard Carney, Comparative 
Approaches to Statutory Interpretation in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions, 36 (1) STATUTE L. REV. 
48, 52 7KHUXOHDJDLQVW µPHUHVXUSOXVDJH¶ LVDFDQRQRI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQFRPPRQODZPHDQLQJ WKDWD
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conditions found in Article 102(c)TFEU to assess whether the conduct under investigation in 
Google Search satisfies them. Thus, the rest of this sub-section will examine the constituent 
elements of Article 102(c)TFEU, namely, the existence of transactions with other trading 
parties (i); the requirement of competitive disadvantage (ii); applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions (iii); the relevance of a downstream/upstream market and vertical 
integration for a finding of abusive discrimination (iv); and, objective justification and lack of 
an exclusionary effect as potential factors that would prevent discriminatory conduct from 
being abusive (v).  
i. Transactions with other trading parties 
The first question concerning the applicability of Article 102(c)TFEU in Google Search is 
ZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHVXFKµWUDQVDFWLRQVZLWKRWKHUWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶WKDWZRXOGSODFHWKHFRQGXFW
in question within the scope of Article 102(c)TFEU. There are two sub-issues within this 
TXHVWLRQ7KHILUVWLVZKHWKHUWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµother trDGLQJSDUWLHV¶H[FOXGHVDILQGLQJRI
abusive discrimination where the discrimination occurs between the dominant undertaking 
LWVHOIDQGDWUDGLQJSDUW\7KHVHFRQGLV WKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶
Regarding the first sub-issue, given that Article 102(c)TFEU explicitly requires 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ WR SXW µother WUDGLQJ SDUWLHV¶ DW D µFRPSHWLWLYH GLVDGYDQWDJH¶ DV D UHVXOW RI
DSSO\LQJ GLVVLPLODU FRQGLWLRQV WR HTXLYDOHQW WUDQVDFWLRQV µZLWK RWKHU WUDGLQJ SDUWLHV¶ LW
appears difficult to argue WKDWWKHSURKLELWLRQFDQEHDSSOLHGWRGLVFULPLQDWLRQEHWZHHQRQH¶V
self and others. Indeed, in the context of Google Search it has been remarked that for 
*RRJOH¶VFRQGXFW WREHDEXVLYH LW LVQHFHVVDU\ WR LGHQWLI\D OHJDO UXOHZKLFK LPSRVHVRQD
dominant undertaking a duty to treat its rivals on non-discriminatory terms.138 Such a rule 
arguably cannot be derived from the general prohibition of discrimination under Article 
102(c)TFEU because that provision prohibits discrimination vis-à-YLVµRWKHUWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶
meaning that the discrimination must occur between parties other than the dominant 
                                                                                                                                       
statute should not be interpreted in a way that will render a word superfluous;  see eg Astoria Fed Sav & Loan 
$VV¶QY6ROLPLQR, 501 US 104, 112 (1991). Therefore, if the alleged abuse is that of discrimination, then the 
conditions found in Article 102(c)TFEU should be satisfied before a finding of an infringement can be made and 
the Commission should not be able to use the non-exhaustive nature of the list of practices to justify finding 
abusive a practice of discrimination that does not fit the requirements of Article 102(c)TFEU. 
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 Nazzini, supra note 19, at 307. In this vein, see also Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Exclusionary Discrimination 
under Article 102 TFEU, 51 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 141 (2014). 
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undertaking itself.139 The second, perhaps more critical, sub-issue is the necessity of there 
EHLQJ µWUDQVDFWLRQV¶ ZLWK µWUDGLQJ SDUWLHV¶ VXEMHFWHG WR GLVFULPLQDWLRQ EHfore such conduct 
can be abusive. In the context of Google Search, this is significant because Google is a two-
sided business, but it is not a three-sided business.140 The argument put forward is that the 
websites that would like WR DSSHDU LQ *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK UHVXOWV DUH QRW WUDGLQJ SDUWQHUV RI
Google because Google seeks to attract users, not websites.141 In fact, even this categorisation 
RI*RRJOH¶VEXVLQHVV may be a simplification: a German court found that Google only has a 
trading relationship with the advertisers and does not have such a relationship even with the 
users of Google Search.142 7KHVXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKHFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHVDUH*RRJOH¶V
trading parties with whom Google has a transactional relationship ± which is a necessary 
requirement for the application of Article 102(c)TFEU ± raises two questions the answers to 
which reveal that there is unlikely to be any such transactional relationship.  
The first question is what these sites provide to Google and what Google provides in 
return that could create a transactional relationship between these sites and Google as trading 
parties. Without a contract by which these sites may advertise on Google Search in return for 
a fee, what Google provides to these sites appears to be free display of the sites on its general 
organic result pages which can lead to traffic to these websites. As for what the websites 
provide to Google in return for the free display which could lead to the creation of a 
trading/business relationship, the answer appears to be nil. This explains why a German court 
QRWHGWKDWVSHFLDOLVWZHEVLWHVZKLFKDSSHDULQVHDUFKUHVXOWVµIUHHULGH¶RQ*RRJOH¶VVHDUFK
engine services and seek (and receive) free promotion of their sites by Google.143 Regarding 
Google Search, WKHUHDUHOHJDOO\QRµWUDQVDFWLRQV¶EHWZHHQ*RRJOHDQGFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJ
sites and the latter VLWHVDUHQRW*RRJOH¶V WUDGLQJSDUWLHVEHFDXVH WKHUH LVQR WUDGHEHWZHHQ
them. Admittedly, in BdKEP WKH&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGWKHYLHZWKDWµWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV¶VKRXOG
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 Nazzini, supra note 19, at 308. 
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 Michael A. Salinger and Robert J. Levinson, µ7KH 5ROH IRU (FRQRPLF $QDO\VLV LQ WKH )7&¶V *RRJOH
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 See Verband Deutscher Wetterdientsleister eV, supra note 142. 
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EHFRQVWUXHGQDUURZO\DV µFRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHV¶144 +RZHYHU LWGLGVRE\QRWLQJ WKDW µ>P@HUH
EXVLQHVVFRQWDFWVEHWZHHQWKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJDQGLWV³WUDGLQJSDUWQHUV´DUHJHQHUDOOy 
FRQVLGHUHG WREHVXIILFLHQW¶145 This decision has not been appealed, and therefore, whether 
WKH(8&RXUWVZRXOGDFFHSWVXFKDEURDGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWUDQVDFWLRQVZLWKWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶
LVXQNQRZQ0RUHRYHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQVWLOOUHTXLUHV there to be at the very 
OHDVWµEXVLQHVVFRQWDFWV¶EHWZHHQWKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJDQGWKHDOOHJHGO\GLVFULPLQDWHG-
against-trading-parties, which suggests that there should at least be the provision of a service 
by the dominant undertaking to those parties and some sort of return for its provision.146 This 
is not the case in Google Search as Google does not provide a service to comparison 
shopping sites or any other sites that (wish to) appear, without payment, on the general result 
pages in response to a search conducted on the search engine. This is not because Google is 
in such an unusual, novel type of business that Article 102(c)TFEU as stipulated would fail to 
FRYHU DQ\DVSHFWRI*RRJOH¶VEXVLQHVV6LPLODU WR WUDditional businesses, Google does have 
µWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶WKHDGYHUWLVHUVZKLFKHQWHULQWRDFRPPHUFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK*RRJOHDQG
SD\WRDGYHUWLVHRQ*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKUHVXOWSDJHV 
The second question regarding the suggestion that Google provides a service that 
ZRXOGUHQGHU WKHZHEVLWHV WKDW PLJKWDSSHDURQ WKHJHQHUDO UHVXOWSDJHV*RRJOH¶V WUDGLQJ
parties is that of what the terms and conditions of the provision of that service are. Notably, 
Google does not make any legally relevant promises to any of the websites the links to which 
might appear on the general result pages: the only set of terms and conditions that Google 
appears to use are those directed to the users of its various services.147 7KHIDFWWKDW*RRJOH¶V
DQGRWKHUVHDUFKHQJLQH¶VZHEFUDZOers index the millions of websites on the Internet does 
QRW FUHDWH D µEXVLQHVV FRQWDFW¶ WKDW FRXOG EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV D WUDGLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ
Google (or other search engine operators) and the potentially infinite number of websites on 
the Internet.148 A web crawler crawling a website is similar to a user visiting a website and 
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37 
 
QHLWKHURIWKHVHDFWLRQVFDQLQLWVHOIFUHDWHµEXVLQHVVFRQWDFW¶RUDµWUDQVDFWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLS¶
EHWZHHQ µWUDGLQJ SDUWLHV¶ DV UHTXLUHG E\ $UWLFOH F7)(8 2QH FRXOG DVN ZKHWKer 
allowing the crawlers to visit a website in question could constitute the subject matter of what 
a website provides (ie consideration in common law jurisdictions) in return for Google being 
able to display the information about that website on search result pages. This, again, is 
unlikely to be a correct legal characterisation of the situation because the websites and the 
information contained therein which the crawlers gather are publicly and freely available. 
Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the act of visiting a website in itself creates a 
transactional/trading-party relationship between a given visitor and the website.149 Holding 
otherwise would amount to  arguing that every time a potential customer enters a shop on the 
high street, they enter into a transactional/trading-party relationship with that shop even if 
they are only browsing. This interpretation is clearly commercially unrealistic and legally 
unlikely in the brick-and-mortar example; it would be just as incorrect in the virtual, website 
context. It appears, then, that there is no relationship between a search engine and the 
websites that (might) appear on the general result pages, without payment, that could be 
meaningfully conceptualised as a transactional/trading-party relationship or business 
contact.150 
                                                                                                                                       
query in the index to find appropriate pages. See, Crawling and Indexing, Google, 
http://www.google.co.uk/insidesearch/howsearchworks/crawling-indexing.html.  
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 In common law, for a promise to be legally binding as a contract, the promise has to be supported by 
µFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶XQOHVVLWLVPDGHLQDGHHG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undertaken by the other; Curie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153. Moreover, consideration must be at the request of 
the other party; London Borough of Southwark LBC v Logan (1997) 29 HLR 40, 40, 45. Furthermore, 
consideration would not be valid where the act or forbearance would have been accomplished by the promisee 
anyway (ie even if the promise had not been made); see EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL¶S LAW OF CONTRACT 86 (13th ed. 
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6RPHFLYLO ODZ MXULVGLFWLRQVDOVRKDYHFRQFHSWV VLPLODU WRFRQVLGHUDWLRQVXFKDV µFDXVH¶ WKDWZRuld be 
required for a promise to be legally binding as a contract; Halson, supra note 118, at 161 n 5. In the context of 
Google Search neither Google nor any given website provides a service to the other at the request of one another 
RU LQ UHWXUQ IRURQHDQRWKHU¶VSURYLVLRQRID VHUYLFH6LPLODUO\ LI LW LVKHOG WKDW*RRJOHDQG WKHZHEVLWHV WKDW
appear on the general result pages do provide something of value to one another which would create a 
transactional/trading-party relationship between them, it would be difficult to argue that they would not have 
provided this thing of value otherwise. The difficulty of conceptualising the existence of a contract aids in 
appreciating the difficulty of conceptualising a trading relationship between a search engine and a given 
website. 
150
 In this vein, see also Nazzini, supra note 19, at 307. 
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ii. Competitive disadvantage 
Another factor that needs to be examined before a finding of abusive discrimination under 
Article 102(c)TFEU can be made concerns the rHTXLUHPHQW RI µFRPSHWLWLYH GLVDGYDQWDJH¶. 
TKH&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH&RXUWVKDYHLQWKHSDVWDGRSWHGDEURDGGHILQLWLRQRIµFRPSHWLWLYH
GLVDGYDQWDJH¶, almost reading this requirement out of the provision in their practice.151 For 
example, the Commission in BdKEP QRWHG WKDW µFRPSHWLWLYH GLVDGYDQWDJH¶ FDQ FRYHU QRW
only the situation whereby the customer of the dominant undertaking is disadvantaged in 
relation to other customers of the dominant undertaking, but also the situation whereby the 
customer is disadvantaged vis-à-vis the dominant undertaking itself.152 For the Commission, 
the latter type of discrimination does not require a competitive relationship between the two 
comparator groups.153 However, two points are noteworthy. First, no matter how liberally the 
competitive disadvantage requirement is interpreted, the finding of abusive discrimination 
itself is still based on the premise that there is a separate, vertical market on which the 
dominant undertaking and the disfavoured competitors are active and compete, as was also 
the case in BdKEP.154 This will be returned to below in the discussion of whether there is 
such a vertically related market in Google Search. Second, the treatment of the requirement 
of competitive disadvantage appears to have changed in the more recent EU-level 
jurisprudence which has somewhat read the requirement back into the provision. This is 
welcome, since as argued by the current author elsewhere, the requirement of competitive 
disadvantage is the factor that distinguishes discrimination that can be a competition issue 
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Deutsche Post had a monopoly, namely the market for basic postal services; BdKEP²Restrictions on Mail 
Preparation, supra note 144, ¶¶ 45, 51. 
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from that which cannot be.155 In British Airways, the CoJ held that in order for Article 
F7)(8 WR EH DSSOLFDEOH µWKHUH PXVW EH D ILQGLQg not only that the behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position is discriminatory, but also that it tends to distort that 
competitive relationship, in other words to hinder the competitive position of some of the 
business partners of that undertakinJLQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHRWKHUV«¶156 Moreover, according to 
the Court, the consequence of Article 102(c)TFEU, in conjunction with then-Article 
3(1)(g)EC (now Protocol 27) is that the commercial behaviour of a dominant undertaking 
should not distort competition on an upstream or downstream market, ie between suppliers or 
customers of that undertaking.157 This means that the co-contractors of that undertaking must 
not be favoured or disfavoured in the area of competition which they practise amongst 
themselves.158 These holdings of the CoJ are not only significant for pointing out that the 
Commission must establish that the discrimination by a dominant undertaking hinders the 
competitive position of some of its business partners in relation to others, they reiterate that 
the provision requires (i) a vertical relation between the dominant undertaking and the parties 
being discriminated against/in favour of which can be categorised as downstream/upstream to 
one another; (ii) the existenFH RI D UHODWLRQVKLS RI µFR-FRQWUDFWRUV¶ µEXVLQHVV SDUWQHUV¶
µVXSSOLHUFXVWRPHU¶ EHWZHHQ WKH GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ DQG WKH SDUWLHV EHLQJ GLVFULPLQDWHG
against/in favour of. In the context of Google Search, as discussed above, it is almost certain 
that Google does not have a contracting or partnership or supply relation with the comparison 
shopping sites (or any sites that do or could appear on general result pages in response to a 
query as long as the results are not paid for as advertisements). As will be discussed below, it 
is also highly questionable that separate markets can be identified that are in a vertical 
relation to one another.  
More recently than British Airways, the CoJ held in Kanal 5 that the placement of 
some parties at a µFRPSHWLWLYH GLVDGYDQWDJH¶ LV LQGHHG QHFHVVDU\ IRU SURYLQJ D EUHDFK RI
Article 102(c)TFEU and the parties in question should be competing on the same market.159 
One must emphasize that it is not just a disadvantage that is required but a competitive 
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disadvantage.160 Any reduced profits would be a disadvantage but do not necessarily affect an 
XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V DELOLW\ WR FRPSHWH WKH REMHFWLYH RI $UWLFOH 7)(8 LV QRW WR SURWHFW
individual interests in a given level of surplus.161 Regarding Google Search, as the 
comparison shopping sites can still compete effectively on the alleged (but debatable) 
UHOHYDQWPDUNHWRIµFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJ¶HYHQZLWKRXWWKHIUHHSURPRWLRQWKH\UHFHLYHIURP
Google, because they have other means of promoting themselves (through online and offline 
advertising, social media, (e)mail campaigns, partnership with retailers/merchants, etc), it is 
not possible to argue that they are put at a competitive disadvantage even if the loss of free 
traffic from Google may be a disadvantage (assuming that there is such a loss of traffic). It is 
also noteworthy that any loss of such free promotion and traffic on the part of comparison 
shopping sites would constitute a gain in the form of free promotion and potentially, traffic 
for sites which appear in the results instead of the comparison shopping sites, including 
Amazon, eBay, relevant retailers, etc. *LYHQ WKDW $PD]RQ VSHFLILFDOO\ LV RQH RI *RRJOH¶V
main rivals, particularly concerning product search, this also points out the potential lack of 
KDUPWRFRPSHWLWLRQWKDWPLJKWUHVXOWIURP*RRJOH¶VSUDFWLFHVLQTXHVWLRQ162 
iii. Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
For Article 102(c)TFEU to be applicable, another requirement is that there must be 
µHTXLYDOHQW¶ transactions WRZKLFK WKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJDSSOLHV µGLVVLPLODUFRQGLWLRQV¶
On the basis of the position that Google is vertically integrated regarding its generalist search 
engine and specialist comparison shopping services, one commentator has noted that it is 
clear that the internal cost structure of a vertically integrated undertaking cannot be 
considered equivalent to a sale to a non-vertically integrated third party; vertical integration 
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makes the transaction in question non-equivalent.163 Indeed, the most obvious reason for 
finding that two transactions are not equivalent has been noted to be different costs involved 
for the supplier in two transactions.164 Furthermore, it has been noted that even a vertically 
integrated dominant undertaking cannot be required to extend any efficiency-enhancing 
measures that benefit its downstream division to all its customers.165 Thus, not benefitting 
oQH¶V GRZQVWUHDP FXVWRPHUV LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ WKDW RQH EHQHILWV RQH¶V RZQ GRZQVWUHDP
GLYLVLRQFDQQRWEHGHHPHG WRDSSO\ µGLVVLPLODUFRQGLWLRQV¶ WR WKHFXVWRPHUV¶RSHUDWLRQVE\
the dominant undertaking. According to some commentators, the discriminatory supply of an 
inferior input can only be abusive when it prevents equally efficient downstream rivals of a 
vertically-integrated undertaking which provides an essential input to its downstream 
competitors and which deliberately increases the efficiency of its own input and not the input 
supplied to the competitor.166 This is not the case in Google Search for several reasons.  
First, Google cannot be said to control an essential input for the business of running a 
comparison shopping site; the provision of comparison shopping sites is not dependent on 
any such input from Google or any other search engine. Second, as discussed below, it is 
highly debatable whether Google is a vertically integrated undertaking that has an upstream 
search engine and a downstream comparison shopping service. Third, it is noteworthy that 
Google Shopping Commercial Unit displays links to merchant sites/retailers where the users 
can purchase the item for which they searched, through clicking on the link displayed within 
the Google Shopping Commercial Unit. Not displaying the links to comparison shopping 
sites in the same manner as Google displays links to merchants/retailers as part of the Google 
Shopping Commercial Unit cannot be deemed discriminatory and cannot be considered to be 
deliberatel\HQKDQFLQJWKHHIILFLHQF\RIRQH¶VRZQLQSXWDQGQRWWKHLQSXWRIWKHFRPSHWLWRU
comparison shopping sites are not merchants/retailers and consumers cannot normally 
purchase products on these sites; consumers would still have to visit the merchant/retailer site 
to make a purchase after visiting the comparison shopping site. Consequently, for Google 
Search, displaying merchant/retailer site results in response to a query about a product that is 
available for sale is not µHTXLYDOHQW¶WRGLVSODying results from comparison shopping sites for 
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WKH VDPH SURGXFW 7KH IRUPHU LV FOHDUO\ D PRUH GLUHFW DQG HIILFLHQW UHVSRQVH WR D XVHU¶V
product search, and a more convenient service to consumers who are interested in making a 
purchase since the latter involves the additional step of going through another website (ie the 
comparison shopping site) before the consumer will be directed to the merchant/retailer site 
where she can make a purchase. In fact, this is the case even if the consumer could directly 
purchase the item on the comparison shopping site in question ± the transactional cost for the 
consumer would still be higher due to the necessity of visiting another website. Moreover, for 
Google, displaying results within the Google Shopping Commercial Unit is not equivalent to 
displaying results as part of the organic results which may include links to comparison 
shopping sites because the former are revenue-generating, paid-for advertisements displayed 
in ad space, whilst the latter are not. Thus, the two types of results generated by two different 
types of relevance algorithm are fundamentally different and their differential treatment 
cannot be deemed discriminatory.  
If the allegation of discrimination is based on the premise that there should be 
equivalent treatment of displaying merchant/retailer results in the Google Shopping 
Commercial Unit and the merchant/retailer results that would come up in the results of 
comparison shopping sites for the same query (ie that discrimination is between the 
merchant/retailer sites depending on whether they appear in Google Shopping Commercial 
8QLW RU LQ FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ VLWH UHVXOWV LW LV DJDLQ LPSRVVLEOH WR VKRZ µHTXLYDOHQW¶
WUDQVDFWLRQV WR ZKLFK WKH GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ DSSOLHV µGLVVLPLODU FRQGLWLRQV¶ 6XFK D
SURSRVLWLRQZRXOG LPSO\ WKDWGLVSOD\LQJ WKH UHVXOWV UHQGHUHGE\*RRJOH¶VRZQDOJRULWKP LV
HTXLYDOHQWWRGLVSOD\LQJWKHUHVXOWVUHQGHUHGE\DFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWH¶VDOJRULWKP7KLV
is clearly incorrect since the algorithms in question are different. It would also imply that 
*RRJOHDSSOLHVµGLVVLPLODUFRQGLWLRQV¶E\UHO\LQJRQWKHDFFXUDF\DQGVXSHULRULW\RILWVRZQ
algorithm as opposed to the algorithms of comparison shopping sites, which does not make 
any business sense. It also does not make any legal sense to expect or require Google to treat 
WKH UHVXOWV RI D FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ VLWH¶V DOJRULWKP HTXDOO\ WR WKH UHVXOWV RI LWV RZQ
algorithm: that requirement would not enhance but reduce competition between providers of 
search which innovate and improve their algorithms to increase the accuracy, relevance and 
therefore, the attractiveness of their offerings for users. 
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It is noteworthy that in Michelin I, ZKLOH RYHUWXUQLQJ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V ILQGLQJ RI
abusive discrimination between Michelin dealers resulting from 0LFKHOLQ¶VV\VWHPRIUHEDWHV
the CoJ indicated that to prove abusive discrimination, the Commission has to establish that 
the differences in treatment of different dealers cannot be justifieGE\µOHJLWLPDWHFRPPHUFLDO
UHDVRQV¶167 In Google Search *RRJOH¶V DOOHJHG GLIIHUHQWLDO WUHDWPHQW RI *RRJOH 6KRSSLQJ
and comparison shopping sites can be justified by the legitimate commercial reason that the 
practices in question require the application of different types of relevance algorithm. Google 
Shopping results displayed under Google Shopping Commercial Unit constitute ads (and are 
GLVSOD\HGLQ*RRJOH¶VDGVSDFHZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHVDQRSSRUWXQLW\FRVWIRU*RRJOHZKLOVWWKH
results on the general search result pages are organic results that are not paid for. In other 
words, whereas the former generates revenue to Google, the latter does not (and in fact, the 
latter would not be provided but for the revenue generated by the former). The difference in 
the nature of the results rendered by different algorithms constitutes a legitimate commercial 
reason which can lead to the differential treatment of ads and organic results without this 
conduct being abusive in line with Michelin I. 
iv. The relevance of a downstream/upstream market and vertical integration  
In FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ GLVFULPLQDWLRQ LV JHQHUDOO\ WKRXJKW WR UHVXOW LQ HLWKHU µSULPDU\¶ RU
µVHFRQGDU\¶ OLQH LQMXU\ WR FRPSHWLWLRQ µ3ULPDU\ OLQH LQMXU\¶ concerns discrimination by a 
dominant firm harming its (horizontal) rivals through exclusionary effects.168 µ6HFRQGDU\OLQH
LQMXU\¶LQFRQWUDVWFRQFHUQVWKHHIIHFWVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQGRZQVWUHDPPDUNHWVZKHUHWKH
customers of the dominant undertaking compete with one another or with third parties.169 In 
the literature, Article 102(c)TFEU has been interpreted as being concerned only with 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQFDXVLQJVHFRQGDU\ OLQH LQMXU\RQ WKHEDVLVRI WKHXVHRISKUDVH µWUDQVDFWLRQV
ZLWKRWKHUWUDGLQJSDUWLHV¶ZKLFKZRXOGH[FOXGHGLVFULPLnation against rivals with whom the 
dominant firm does not have a direct transactional relationship.170 Some commentators have 
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 See 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 779 and, more broadly, JONES AND SUFRIN, supra note 96, 
at 398; Santiago Martinez Lage and Rafael Allendesalazar, Community Policy on Discriminatory Pricing: A 
3UDFWLWLRQHU¶V3HUVSHFWLYH, in WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION? 325, 341 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
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DOVRDUJXHGWKDWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIµFRPSHWLWLYHGLVDGYDQWDJH¶LQ$UWLFOHF7)(8PDNHV
the finding of a discriminatory abuse dependent on finding a downstream market on which 
the relevant firms compete.171 6HYHUDODXWKRUVKDYHFRQVHTXHQWO\FULWLFLVHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
DQG WKH &RXUWV¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH F7)(8 WR exclusionary practices which they 
argue should be dealt with under Article 102(b)TFEU (prohibiting the limitation of 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers).172 It has been 
argued that although Article 102(c)TFEU has been applied in a few cases to exclusionary 
conduct where the only issue was discrimination, usually in favour of the dominant 
XQGHUWDNLQJ¶VRZQGRZQVWUHDPRSHUDWLRQVDQGWRWKHGHWULPHQWRIGRZQVWUHDPULYDOVZKRDUH
both customers and competitors, in most cases exclusionary conduct involving discrimination 
has been analysed under the particular abuses concerned such as predatory pricing, margin 
squeeze or refusal to deal.173 This could cover several cases that involved discrimination by a 
non-vertically-integrated undertaking where the practice, even if in nature discriminatory, 
was assessed in the particular context of the specific conduct such as rebates, refusal to deal, 
etc.174 Where the dominant undertaking is not vertically integrated and discriminates between 
its customers with whom it does not compete on any market, the incentives for distorting 
competition between such customers is unlikely to be strong in the absence of a potential 
effect on the competitive position of the horizontal rivals of the dominant undertaking. 
Indeed, findings of discrimination based only on differences in the prices or terms offered to 
similarly-VLWXDWHGFXVWRPHUVKDYHEHHQµDQH[WUHPHUDULW\XQGHU$UWLFOH7)(8¶175 Where 
                                                                                                                                       
Competition Law: Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search of Limiting Principles?, 2(3) J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 479, 487 (2006); Damien Gerard, Price Discrimination under Article 82(c) EC: Clearing up the 
Ambiguities, in GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW CENTRE RESEARCH PAPERS ON ARTICLE 82 EC ± JULY 2005, 132 
arguing that primary line injury should be dealt with under Article 102(b)TFEU; Michel Waelbroeck, Price 
Discrimination and Rebate Policies under EU Competition Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 1995 147, 160 (Barry Hawk ed, 1996); RENATO NAZZINI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW: THE OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 102 250-251 (2011); 
DAMIEN GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR AND NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 305-
307 (2012). 
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172
 See eg GERADIN, LAYNE-FARRAR AND PETIT, supra note 170, at 307; Geradin and Petit, supra note 170, at 
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 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 780.  
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no distortion of competition is expected as a result of discrimination, it is possible that 
discrimination may actually increase welfare, for example, through increasing output.176  
In cases where there is no potentially abusive practice other than discrimination and 
discrimination aims at harming the downstream competitors of a vertically integrated 
XQGHUWDNLQJVXFKFRQGXFWFDQDUWLILFLDOO\UDLVHULYDOV¶FRVWVDQGLIWKHKDUPLVVHULRXVHQRXJK
and the rivals are important to consumers, may also harm consumer welfare.177 Since the 
potential argument for an abuse of discrimination in Google Search is of this type, ie it 
involves the dominant undertaking discriminating in favour of its own downstream 
operations, the existence of a downstream market and Google¶V being a vertically integrated 
undertaking present on the upstream and downstream markets become essential for assessing 
whether the facts of Google Search fall within the relevant case law. 
Most cases concerning discrimination by a vertically- integrated dominant 
undertaking involved former State monopolies whose markets were opened to competition 
where downstream rivals remained dependent on the vertically-integrated dominant 
undertaking.178 Indeed, the cases of discrimination by a vertically-integrated dominant 
undertaking which was a ((former) State or de facto) monopoly and/or controlled an essential 
facility include many ± if not all ± of the cases that could be/have been used to support the 
position that the conduct in Google Search may be abusively discriminatory, such as 
Deutsche Bahn;179 Clearstream;180 GT-Link;181 ITT Promedia;182 BdKEP;183 E.On;184 and 
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 According to economics, discrimination can either reduce or increase consumer welfare; its effects on 
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 Case C-242/95, GT-Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner (DSB), 1997 E.C.R. I-4499. 
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 See Eur. ComP¶n Press Release IP/97/292, Settlement reached with Belgacom on the publication of 
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GDF.185 In all these cases, there was a dominant undertaking which in most cases was a 
monopoly and which was treating a subsidiary/sister company more favourably than the 
downstream competitors of the dominant undertaking on a separate downstream market 
which concerned a separate service/product than the one over which the undertaking in 
question was dominant.186 It has, in fact, been noted in the literature that the issue of 
discrimination against rivals is most likely to arise in the case of liberalised utilities where the 
relevant markets are not yet fully competitive.187 It must, therefore, be emphasised that 
Google is not a monopoly on any of the markets that the Commission identified as the 
relevant markets (the markets for web search; search advertising and comparison shopping) 
since it has competitors on all of these markets, which would distinguish Google Search from 
most ± if not all ± of the cases mentioned immediately above. 
The cases discussed above emphasize several factors that need to be established by 
the Commission before Google Search could be fitted into the case law on discrimination 
under Article 102TFEU. First, the theory of discrimination against Google could only work if 
Google is found to be a vertically integrated undertaking active on more than one level of 
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SURGXFWLRQSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHV7KLVZRXOGUHTXLUHSURYLQJWKDW*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKHQJLQHDQG
other services such as comparison shopping are not only on different, separate markets, but 
also that they are in a vertical relation to one another. Otherwise, if Google is not a vertically 
LQWHJUDWHG XQGHUWDNLQJ IRU H[DPSOH EHFDXVH *RRJOH¶V FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ VHUYLFH is 
VLPSO\ D IHDWXUH RI *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK HQJLQH WKHQ WKHUH LV QR GLVFULPLQDWLRQ EHWZHHQ
GRZQVWUHDP RSHUDWRUV RU EHWZHHQ GRZQVWUHDP RSHUDWRUV DQG *RRJOH¶V RZQ RSHUDWLRQV
because there are no such different operators to discriminate between. If Google is not 
vertically integrated, the theory of self-preferencing is unsustainable since there is no separate 
downstream Google operation to favour and there is no suggestion that Google discriminates 
between different comparison shopping sites inter se, which implies that the theory of 
discrimination is untenable. Any theory of exclusion would then have to be built on a 
conceptual premise other than discrimination: the theory of distorting competition by 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ LQ IDYRXU RI RQH¶V VHOI WR GLVDdvantage downstream rivals is dependent on 
there being a vertically integrated firm that is dominant on the upstream/downstream level 
and is leveraging its dominance into the downstream/upstream market. If there are no such 
separate operations on separate markets and there is no vertical integration, then the theory of 
leveraging market power through discrimination collapses. One cannot envisage building a 
theory of discrimination that would cause primary line injury to competition by harming 
*RRJOH¶V KRUL]RQWDO ULYDOV HLWKHU DQ\ GLVFULPLQDWLRQ E\ *RRJOH EHWZHHQ FRPSDULVRQ
VKRSSLQJVLWHVZRXOGQRWKXUWEXWHIIHFWLYHO\KHOS*RRJOH6HDUFK¶VKRUL]RQWDOULYDOVVXFKDV
Bing, DuckDuckGo, etc since the conduct would make these other search engines more 
attractive to those comparison shopping sites as alternative venues of generating traffic. Thus, 
the allegations of discrimination can indeed only involve an allegation of secondary line 
injury to competition. 
Whether Google Shopping could be deemed to be a separate service on a separate 
market from Google Search that is in a vertical relation to the search engine is indeed 
TXHVWLRQDEOH$OWKRXJK*RRJOHKDVEHHQQRWHGWREHDµKRUL]RQWDO¶RUJHQHUDOSXUSRVHVHDUFK
engine because it seeks to cover the Internet as completely as possible, which is distinct from 
µYHUWLFDO¶ VHDUFK HQJLQHV WKDW IRFXV RQ QDUURZO\ GHILQHG FDWHJRULHV RI FRQWHQW VXFK DV
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shopping or travel,188 at a conceptual level, this distinction makes little sense. This is because, 
in terms of what users search for on any search engine, it is difficult to argue that some search 
TXHULHVDUHµJHQHUDO¶KRUL]RQWDOZKLOVWVRPHRWKHUVDUHµVSHFLILF¶YHUWLFDO$XVHUZKRXVHVD
search engine always seeks information on a specific, narrowly defined potential category of 
content. No user is interested in conducting a search on Google Search that would make the 
VHDUFKHQJLQHEULQJXS WKHHQWLUHFRQWHQWRI WKHZRUOGZLGHZHEDVD µJHQHUDOLVW¶KRUL]RQWDO
search engine. If Google Search did bring up the entire content of the worldwide web in 
response to a search query, it would make it a very poor search engine for not answering the 
specific query of the user. Arguing that certain websites whose scope is limited to providing 
answers to queries concerning certain categories of information and Google Shopping are in a 
vertical relation to Google Search is analogous to arguing that a supermarket is in a vertical 
relation to its bakery section and to all the bakeries in the vicinity. It is also analogous to 
arguing not only that the supermarket is in a vertical relation to all the bakeries in the vicinity, 
but simultaneously also to all the butchers, all the newsagents, all the greengrocers, all the 
boutiques if it sells clothing, etc. This is clearly bizarre in the supermarket context not least 
EHFDXVH LI RQH WRRN DZD\ DOO RI WKH RIIHULQJV IRXQG LQ WKHVH DUJXDEO\ µVSHFLDOLVW¶ VHFWLRQV
IURPWKHVXSHUPDUNHW¶VRIIHULQJVWKHUHZRXOGEHQRWKLQJOHIWthat the supermarket could offer 
to customers. The operation of a supermarket in that sense is not that dissimilar to the 
operation of a search engine (except that the search engine does not sell anything to the users 
on the one side of the market, but sells advertising to the advertisers on the other side of the 
two-sided market, which makes the vertical integration argument even less tenable).189 The 
fact that a supermarket is able to provide customers with all these different offerings in 
different sections under one roof is what makes the supermarket a supermarket. These 
µVSHFLDOLVW¶ VHFWLRQV DUH FRQVWLWXHQW HOHPHQWV RI D VXSHUPDUNHW 0RUHRYHU DUJXLQJ WKDW D
bakery, a greengrocer or a butcher, etc is a downstream operation in relation to a supermarket 
would also be bizarre because the supermarket is already at the final level of the vertical 
production chain: the customers of the supermarket are final consumers which use the 
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49 
 
services of the supermarket. This is similar to the fact that the search engine service Google 
provides is provided to users who search for queries on Google Search. There is no 
intermediary, downstream level of service/operation between Google and the users for 
VSHFLDOLVW W\SHVRITXHULHV*RRJOH LVDW WKHHQGRI WKHµSURGXFWLRQFKDLQ¶ LI there is such a 
vertical production chain at all. The existence of such a chain is necessarily implied by the 
proposition that Google is a vertically integrated undertaking, which itself is necessary for the 
DOOHJDWLRQRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQIDYRXURIRQH¶VVHOIDQGDJDLQVWRQH¶VGRZQVWUHDP competitor 
to be sustainable since, without such vertical integration, there cannot be downstream 
customers and consequently, secondary line injury to competition. 
The presentation of shopping results displayed in the Google Shopping Commercial 
Unit (and under Google Shopping) can be seen as an improvement of Google Search itself 
over the previous presentations RIUHVXOWVE\*RRJOHDQGKDVEHHQGHHPHGWREHDµSURGXFW
GHVLJQ¶IHDWXUHE\WKH)7&DQGVRPHcourts around the world.190 This suggests that Google 
Shopping is not a distinct operation of Google on a market separate from the market on which 
the search engine operates, but a means of presenting the relevant results for a sub-group of 
users who search for a product on Google Search with the intention to make a purchase. 
Furthermore, holding that Google Search is in a vertical, upstream relation to Google 
Shopping and consequently, to any other comparison shopping site would open up the 
possibility of finding a search engine in a vertical relation and thus an upstream competitive 
position with an unlimited number of potential sites that may provide a service that makes up 
a sub-FDWHJRU\ RI UHVXOWV WKDW PLJKW FRPH XS RQ *RRJOH¶V general search result pages in 
UHVSRQVH WR D TXHU\ 7KLV ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ µRSHQ WKH IORRGJDWHV¶ and could have a chilling 
effect on innovation.191 
The questionable categorisation of Google Shopping as a separate product/service in a 
vertical relation with Google Search and in competition with other such comparison shopping 
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sites is also challenged by Google¶V EXVLQHVV PRGHO *RRJOH¶V UHYHQXH FRPHV IURP
advertisements placed on its website alongside or as part of search results (both of which 
expressly indicate these to be advertisements or sponsored results). This business model does 
not change according to whether Google provides the shopping results in response to a 
product query grouped and displayed together as the Google Shopping Commercial Unit (or 
Google Shopping) results or whether Google provides these results as text ads without 
grouping the shopping results. The results displayed within the Google Shopping Commercial 
Unit (and Google Shopping) are advertisements for the product in question similar to the 
advertisements displayed outside of the Google Shopping Commercial Unit (and Google 
Shopping) for the same (similar) product(s).  Grouping shopping results together makes it 
easier for those users who, for example, VHDUFKIRUµGLJLWDOFDPHUD¶ZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQWREX\D
camera to select an advertisement that is of interest to them. Such grouping also makes it 
easier for users who are not LQWHUHVWHGLQSXUFKDVLQJDµGLJLWDOFDPHUD¶EXWDUHLQWHUHVWHGLn, 
for example, the history of digital cameras, to skip over the advertisements of cameras for 
sale. This convenience for users who are interested in purchasing cameras may also increase 
*RRJOH¶VFKDQFHVRI UHFHLYLQJUHPXQHUDWLRQIURPWKHGLVSOD\RI WKHDGvertisement, but this 
alone does not make the display of shopping results under the Google Shopping Commercial 
Unit a separate operation ± let alone a separate relevant market ± from the search engine. 
v. Objective justification and exclusionary effect 
Even if Google were found to be a vertically integrated undertaking by the Commission for 
the purposes of Google Search and the remaining conditions of Article 102(c)TFEU were 
satisfied, as noted above, objective justification is also always available to a dominant 
undertaking to defend its conduct. In fact, in Post Danmark I the CoJ seems to have gone 
further than simply restating the availability of objective justification by holding that in the 
FRQWH[WRISULFHGLVFULPLQDWLRQµtKHIDFWWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHRIDGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJPD\«
EH GHVFULEHG DV µSULFH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ « FDQQRW RI LWVHOI VXJJHVW WKDW WKHUH H[LVWV DQ
H[FOXVLRQDU\ DEXVH¶192 Although the CoJ has not elaborated on this statement, one could 
argue that discrimination without more does not constitute an exclusionary abuse under 
Article 102TFEU. This is different to stating the availability of an objective justification 
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(which is currently a defence to be proven by the undertaking) since it suggests that without 
separately proving an exclusionary effect, discrimination does not constitute abuse in the first 
SODFH 0RUHRYHU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH &RXUW µ« QRW HYHU\ H[FOXVLRQDU\ HIIHFW LV QHFHVVDULO\
detrimental to competition ... Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the 
departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so 
less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, 
qualit\ RU LQQRYDWLRQ¶193 Nor does Article 102TFEU seek to ensure that competitors less 
efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position should remain on the market.194 In 
Google Search it is therefore fundamental to establish that any undertaking arguably being 
excluded from the market as a result of discrimination is not only as efficient as Google, but 
also has at least as attractive offers DV *RRJOH¶V DQG RWKHU FRPSHWLWRUV¶ to consumers in 
terms of of price, choice, quality or innovation. It is certainly debatable whether comparison 
shopping sites offer any additional value to consumers over and beyond what a search engine 
provides under one roof.195 More importantly, there has to be exclusion of these comparison 
shopping sites from the relevant market, which is factually disputed by the growth of some of 
these sites in the investigation period and by the fact that such specialist sites have many 
other means of reaching consumers than through free promotion provided by Google search 
results.196 
Regarding the availability of an objective justification defence against a finding of 
discrimination in Google Search, the practice in question can be conceptualised as delivering 
efficiencies that benefit consumers. As WKHVHDUFKHQJLQHSURYLGHVDQVZHUVWRXVHUV¶TXHULHV
doing so in a way that minimises the costs of a search for a user is clearly an efficiency gain 
that benefits consumers. Displaying the Google Shopping Commercial Unit in response to a 
XVHU¶V TXHU\ ILUVW SURYLGHV WKH XVHU ZLWK D FRQYHQLHQW GLVSOD\ RI SURGXFW-related results 
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grouped together, and second, saves the user who has the intention of purchasing a product 
from having to click through to another website (eg comparison shopping site) before she can 
(reach the merchant/retailer site where she can) actually make a purchase. This, in turn, 
increases the efficiency of Google Search because it enables it to provide those users 
interested in shopping with the relevant shopping results in the most convenient way possible, 
thereby increasing the usefulness and attractiveness of the search engine. In fact, 
µLPSURYHPHQWV LQ WKH TXDOLW\ RI JRRGV>VHUYLFHV@¶ LV H[SOLFLWO\ acknowledged by the 
Commission as an example of increasing efficiency that may satisfy the objective 
justification defence under Article 102TFEU .197 It is clear, therefore, that the conduct in 
Google Search can be objectively justified due to generating efficiencies that also benefit 
consumers. 
 
C. Tying 
Some commentators have raised the possibility that the conduct in question in Google Search 
FDQ EH FRQFHSWXDOLVHG DV µW\LQJ¶ 7KH DUJXPHQW LV WKDW WKH SUDFWLFH FRQFHUQV WKH W\LQJ RI
Google content to search results or the tying of Universal Search with specialised search 
tools.198 Tying refers to a situation where customers who purchase one product (the tying 
product) are required to also purchase another product from the dominant undertaking (the 
tied product).199 7\LQJLVSURKLELWHGXQGHU$UWLFOHG7)(8ZKLFKVWLSXODWHVWKDWµPDNLQJ
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
WKH VXEMHFW RI VXFK FRQWUDFWV¶ PD\ EH DQ DEXVH $ OLWHUDO UHDGLQJ RI WKLV SURYLVLRQ ZRXOG
exclude Google Search from being a potential case of tying under Article 102TFEU since 
there is no contractual relationship between the users of the search engine and Google, by 
which Google contractually (or otherwise) obliges those who wish to use the search engine to 
also use its specialist services. Consequently, the only possible theory of tying in Google 
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Search is that there is technical tying, a type of tying that has been found to be potentially 
abusive despite not explicitly being covered by Article 102TFEU.200 Technical tying occurs, 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQµZKHQWKHW\LQJSURGXFWLVGHVLJQHGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWLWRQO\
works properly wLWKWKHWLHGSURGXFWDQGQRWZLWKDOWHUQDWLYHVRIIHUHGE\FRPSHWLWRUV¶201 A 
OLWHUDO UHDGLQJRI WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHILQLWLRQZRXOG also exclude Google Search from the 
scope of abusive technical tying since Google Search cannot be said to work properly only 
with the tied product (eg Google Shopping Commercial Unit) and not with alternatives 
offered by competitors (eg with results of comparison shopping sites). However, since the 
*XLGDQFHLVOLPLWHGWRDQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSULRrities rather than 
constituting a statement of law, the rest of the section will explore whether there can be an 
issue of technical tying in Google Search.202 
Given that technical tying in the absence of a contractual relationship is not covered 
by Article 102(d)TFEU, an assessment of the conditions stipulated in Article 102(d)TFEU 
will not be conducted here.203 Consequently, the relevant inquiry becomes that into the 
conditions established in the case law for tying to be abusive. There are four cumulative 
conditions for tying to be abusive: the tying and tied products are two separate products; the 
undertaking concerned is dominant on the market for the tying product; the undertaking 
concerned does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product; tying forecloses competition.204 Some commentators have suggested that tying 
would be easier to prove than refusal to deal for the Commission in Google Search since once 
there is tying of two distinct products and the undertaking is dominant, a simple likelihood of 
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anticompetitive effects may suffice to apply Article 102TFEU.205 As mentioned above, this 
article assumes that the CoPPLVVLRQ¶V PDUNHW GHILQLWLRQ DQG ILQGLQJ RI GRPLQDQFH DUH
correct, and will thus proceed to only discuss the remaining conditions.206 Consequently, the 
rest of this sub-section will examine the requirement of two separate products/services (i); 
lack of customer choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product (ii); foreclosure 
of competition (iii); and, objective justification (iv). 
i. Two separate products/services  
The first issue in Google Search is to establish that there are two separate products/services in 
TXHVWLRQ8QGHUWKHW\LQJWKHRU\*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKHQJLQHLVWKHµW\LQJSURGXFW¶VLQFHLWLVWKH
market for general search (as defined by the Commission) over which Google is dominant.207  
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHFDVHODZDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*Xidance, the test for whether two 
products are distinct is to be assessed by reference to consumer demand.208 Some 
commentators have remarked that under EU competition law, for a product to be considered 
distinct, it is not necessary that it constitutes a relevant market and the existence of different 
sources of supply (particularly competing suppliers of the tied product) may indicate that the 
products are distinct.209 The suggestion is that the existence of a significant number of 
competitors present only in specialised (vertical) search may suggest that Universal Search 
and specialised search are distinct products.210 6LPLODUO\ UHJDUGLQJ *RRJOH¶V DGGLWLRQDO
services, it has been argued that the tying and tied products are distinct products because they 
RIIHUGLIIHUHQWIXQFWLRQDOLWLHVDQGDUHQRW LQWHUFKDQJHDEOHIURPDFRQVXPHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH211 
However, the accuracy of this position is debatable. For a user who is interested in 
purchasing a product, the search engine constitutes a tool for conducting a search with the 
expectation that the results will include those which would enable a purchase; thus, a 
FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ VLWH¶V RIIHULQJ DQG WKH VHDUFK HQJLQH¶V RIIHULQJ IRU SURGXFW VHDUFK
TXHULHV DUH LQWHUFKDQJHDEOH IURP WKH FRQVXPHU¶V SHUVSHctive. In fact, if they were not 
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interchangeable, then it is difficult to see how the argument for potential exclusion would 
work (ie if the search engine services are not interchangeable for the services of the 
comparison shopping site, then the search engine cannot even theoretically exclude the 
comparison shopping sites). This reveals that a comparison shopping site provides a service 
that constitutes a subset of the functions that a general search engine entails.212 This does not 
make the different types of results that a general search engine provides (eg those that enable 
the user to purchase a digital camera and those that provide information on how a digital 
camera works) separate products/services for the search engine. It also cannot be argued that 
there is complementarity between the search engine and a comparison shopping site, which 
was suggested to be a reason for which Windows Media Player (WMP) and Windows OS 
could be considered as separate products.213 Similarly, it cannot be claimed ± unlike in 
Microsoft ± WKDWWKHDUJXDEO\VHSDUDWHSURGXFWVµFOHDUO\GLIIHULQWHUPVRIIXQFWLRQDOLWLHV¶214 
For a generalist search engine, showing results that display items to purchase in response to a 
product search query is not a complementary function; it is part of the essential function of 
the search engine since without these results, the search engine will have omitted a category 
of relevant results for that query. In Microsoft it was held by the GC that there was nothing 
preventing Microsoft from distributing WMP in the same way as it had distributed its 
previous player which had been included on the Windows installation CD and had to be 
installed by the users if they wished to use it.215 This is significantly different from the factual 
situation in Google Search and demonstrates that Google Shopping Commercial Unit cannot 
EHGHHPHG WREH D VHSDUDWHSURGXFWVHUYLFH IURP*RRJOH¶V VHDUFKHQJLQH WKHUH LV QRRWKHU
means available to Google to provide shopping results to a user who has a product search 
query on Google Search other than to display these as part of the general result pages. The 
display of shopping results is simply a functionality feature of the search engine for a certain 
type of query (ie product search) and forms part of the general results of Google Search. This 
LVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHPDUNLQWKH*XLGDQFHWKDWµ[t]wo products are distinct if, 
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in the absence of tying or bundling, a substantial number of customers would purchase or 
would have purchased the tying product without also buying the tied product from the same 
VXSSOLHU«¶216 In the context of Google Search, the Commission would have to prove that a 
substantial number of users who choose to use Google Search to conduct, for example, 
product searches would prefer the search engine without the shopping results over a search 
engine with the shopping results. Further, it would have to be proven that, even though these 
users have chosen to conduct a product search on Google, they would rather obtain the 
UHOHYDQW VKRSSLQJ UHVXOWV IURP DQRWKHU VXSSOLHU 7KLV ZRXOG QRW RQO\ LJQRUH WKH XVHUV¶
preference demonstrated by choosing Google Search, amongst other options, on which to 
conduct their search in the first place, but is factually unlikely to be correct, as demonstrated 
by the practices of the other search engines which display shopping results similar to Google 
Search in response to product searches.217 Similarly, in Google Search not only the alleged 
tied product, but also the alleged tying product are offered to users for free; it is highly 
unlikely that a user would prefer a less functional service over a more functional service 
when she does not pay for either version. In fact, this appears to have been even the case in 
Microsoft since the absence of demand for the version of the Windows OS without WMP ± as 
imposed on Microsoft by the Commission as the remedy ± raises serious doubts about the 
finding in Microsoft that there were two separate products (or that when given the choice, 
consumers prefer to obtain the tying product without also obtaining the tied product from the 
same supplier).218  
7KHVWDWHPHQWLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGDQFHFRQFHUQLQJWKHµSUHVHQFHRQWKHPDUNHW
of undertakings specialised in the manufacture or sale of the tied product without the tying 
SURGXFW¶ FDQQRW EH XVHG WR FRQVWUXFW DQ DUJXPHQW WKDW JHQHUDO VHDUFK DQG VSHFLDOLVW VHDUFK
results are two distinct products either.219 This is because such a focus on the supply side as 
opposed to the demand side in Google Search is not desirable or justified for several reasons. 
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First, unlike in the case of consumables (as was the case in Hilti to which the Commission 
refers in support of its statement in the Guidance) and aftermarkets, there is no discernible 
dependency between the tied product (comparison shopping services) and the tying product 
(the search engine) in Google Search. Second, if one were to decide that the Google 
Shopping Commercial Unit is a separate product from general search, then there would 
potentially be an infinite number of separate products on the basis of the infinite number of 
VHDUFKHVRQHFDQHQYLVDJHRQ*RRJOH6HDUFKZKLFKZRXOGOHDGWR*RRJOH¶VOLDELOLW\IRUW\LQJ
whenever Google displays results relating to these searches grouped together and it happens 
to be the case that there are specialist websites which only respond to searches of the same 
type. This would impose a serious ± and unjustifiable ± FRQVWUDLQW RQ *RRJOH¶V DELOLW\ WR
improve its own algorithm and design its own pages. It would also open the floodgates to 
claims of alleged tying on the basis of the mere fact that Google Search can respond to more 
search queries ± arguably an indication of being a superior service ± than some other sites 
with more limited scope. Third, if the objective of the EU competition rules is ultimately the 
enhancement of the welfare of consumers, then the criterion in deciding whether there is 
separate consumer demand for a given product is more appropriately based consumer demand 
(rather than supply) and whether a substantial number of consumers would purchase the tying 
product without the tied product from the same supplier in the absence of a tie.  
ii. Lack of customer choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product 
Regarding the condition that the undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the 
two products separately, it would have to be proven that the tying product (ie Google Search) 
is not available without the tied product (ie the Google Shopping Commercial Unit). It has 
EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW *RRJOH LPSRVHV D WLH EHFDXVH µ>X@VHUV FDQ RQO\ REWDLQ *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK
results together with whatever additional links Google elects to present. There is no way for 
users to avoid links to Google¶V DGGLWLRQDO VHUYLFHVZKLOH VWLOO UHFHLYLQJ*RRJOH VHDUFK¶220 
This is arguably despite the fact that users are not forced to click on these links for additional 
services and could simply ignore them.221 7KHDUJXPHQWLVWKDWµSURPLQHQFH¶PDWWHUVZKHQ
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XVHUVDUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKOLQNVWR*RRJOH¶VVHUYLFHVXVHUVSURFHHGDFFRUGLQJO\222 However, 
these arguments are open to challenge. First, users receive Google Search results without any 
grouped results being displayed in response to searches for which Google does not have 
relevant µspecialist¶ results.223 Second, even for every product search, Google Search does not 
display the Google Shopping Commercial Unit since this display only takes place on the 
EDVLVRIWKHDOJRULWKP¶V relevance criteria: there have to be relevant Google Shopping results 
WKDWFDQEHGLVSOD\HGLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHXVHU¶VSDUWLFXODUTXHU\224 Therefore, the suggestion 
WKDW*RRJOH6HDUFKLVQRWDYDLODEOHZLWKRXW*RRJOH¶VDGded features is factually incorrect; for 
given queries, generic results are provided without any added features such as Google 
Shopping results, etc. Consequently,  to argue that there is a tie, one would have to base that 
argument on specific types of queries. For example, one would have to argue that for 
shopping queries, the search engine is never available without the Google Shopping 
Commercial Unit. However, the implication of this is that one would have to establish the 
VHDUFK HQJLQH¶V GRPLQDQFH per query (or per query type) and also demonstrate that, for 
example, there is never a product search that would not return some affiliated Google feature 
such as the Shopping Commercial Unit (which, as mentioned above, is factually incorrect). 
Not only would it be a cKDOOHQJHWRSURYHWKDWDµUHOHYDQWPDUNHW¶H[LVWVIRUVSHFLILFVHDUFK
queries or for specific types of search queries, if this was to be done, it would also have to be 
established that Google is dominant for that particular type of search query since if there is no 
dominance in the tying product, there cannot be abusive tying. Yet, it is clear that users have 
many options for finding answers to such queries and an assessment of dominance would 
have to include every site and app (and possibly the offline means) to which users could turn 
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for answers.225 This factual difference also distinguishes Google Search from Microsoft since 
in the latter, once a consumer purchased a PC with the Windows OS, the PC was delivered 
with WMP preinstalled by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) with no possibility 
to uninstall; there was categorically no technical availability of using the Windows OS (the 
tying product) without the WMP (the tied product) on these PCs sold through the OEMs.226 
The suggestion that prominence of links suggests a tie also ignores the possible 
DUJXPHQW WKDW XVHUV ZKR FOLFN RQ *RRJOH¶V OLQNV PD\ do so not (just) because they are 
prominent but because they believe that Google Search provides high quality results in 
response to searches and therefore, their clicks represent their preferences. If the users indeed 
SUHIHU*RRJOH¶VOLQNV, then they cannot be deemed to be µFRHUFHG¶LQWRXVLQJ*RRJOH¶VDGGHG
features.227 Furthermore, a Google Search results page never consists of an otherwise blank 
page with *RRJOH¶V RZQ DIILOLDWed feature links. These links ± some of which are simply 
advertisements such as those within the Google Shopping Commercial Unit ± are 
accompanied by a list of organic results. Features of rivals can appear in the organic results, 
and in any case, the mere existence of the organic results ± for which there is no payment or 
*RRJOH¶VµIDYRXULQJ¶RILWVRZQVHUYLFHV± always provides alternatives and additional choice 
to users. The equivalent factual scenario can be thought to be similar to PCs with Windows 
OS that arrive preinstalled with WMP also listing other media players available on the market 
on the desktop without, however, having any of these preinstalled on the PC. Interestingly, 
this was exactly the commitment that was offered and accepted inMicrosoft (Tying) which 
FRQFHUQHG0LFURVRIW¶VDOOHJHGDEXVHRIW\LQJ,QWHUQHW([SORUHUWR:LQGRZVOS. To eliminate 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPSHWLWLRQFRQFHUQV0LFURVRIWFRPPLWWHG WRSURYLGH D µEURZVHU FKRLFH
VFUHHQ¶ ZKLFK ZRXOG list other browsers available for users to download (as opposed to 
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preinstalling these other browsers whenever Internet Explorer was preinstalled on a PC).228 
Given that any search on Google Search by its nature provides a list of relevant (organic) 
alternatives to whichever special feature of Google the results may also display, it is difficult 
WRDUJXH WKDW WKHUH LV D µWLH¶ WKDWFDQ IRUHFORVH WKHPDUNHW IRU WKDW VSHFLDO IHDWXUH ,W LV DOVR
difficult to suggest that the consumers are deprived of the choice to obtain the tying product 
without the tied product.229 
iii. Foreclosure of competition 
The existence or lack of a tie in Google Search is closely related to the final condition of 
tying, namely that tying forecloses competition. Conduct will be abusive only if it is capable 
of restricting competition.230 In Microsoft the Commission held that there were good reasons 
not to assume that tying in itself constitutes conduct which by its very nature is liable to 
foreclose competition.231 This is because the Commission decided that unlike in traditional 
tying cases where the foreclosure effect for competitors was demonstrated by the bundling of 
the two products, in Microsoft the users could and to an extent did obtain third party media 
players through the Internet, sometimes for free.232 According to the Commission, this fact 
necessitated an analysis of the effects of tying on competition.233 In Google Search the fact 
that both of the allegedly separate products are free to use, that product design changes of the 
NLQGDWLVVXHDUHQRWµE\LWVYHU\QDWXUH¶OLDEOHWRIRUHFORVHFRPSHWLWLRQDQGWKDWWKHUHLVQR
LVVXH RI WXUQLQJ *RRJOH &RPPHUFLDO 6KRSSLQJ 8QLW LQWR µWKH SODWIRUP RI FKRLFH IRU
complementary content and applications which in turn risks foreclosing competition in the 
PDUNHW IRU WKH WLHG SURGXFW¶234 suggest that the Commission should argumentum a fortiori 
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conduct an effects-based assessment of foreclosure and not find foreclosure on the basis of 
simple tying (assuming that a tie could be established).235  
In Microsoft the foreclosure effect was linked to Microsoft¶V unparalleled advantage 
of distribution of its product which ensured ubiquity of WMP on client PCs which provided a 
disincentive for users to utilise third-party media players and for OEMs to preinstall such 
players on PCs.236 Further, other methods such as downloading, bundling it with other 
software, etc were found to be inefficient and ineffective means of distributing software in 
comparison to preinstalling WMP on Windows.237 In this context, a significant issue in 
Microsoft was network effects: installing WMP on Windows ± holding a market share of 
90% on the PC operating systems market ± led to the ubiquity of WMP and that in turn meant 
that content providers and software developers were more likely to use the WMP format to 
the detriment of the competitors and their technologies, which in turn led to increased 
popularity of WMP for users.238 This differs significantly from the factual situation in Google 
Search. Other than the fact that there are generalist search engine competitors of Google, 
*RRJOH¶VDOOHJHG W\LQJFDQQRWSUHYHQW WKHFRPSHWLWRUV LHFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHV IURP
reaching users by simply displaying the Google Shopping Commercial Unit to users. The 
competitors and their services are available for users to access them directly and these 
competitors have many more means of reaching users than receiving free traffic from Google 
Search. Moreover, the competitors continue to receive free traffic from Google Search when 
WKHLUZHEVLWHVDUHUHOHYDQWWRDXVHU¶VTXHU\RQWKHEDVLVRI*RRJOH¶VDOJRULWKP 
Another important factor in Microsoft regarGLQJ IRUHFORVXUH ZDV WKDW 0LFURVRIW¶V
tying interfered with the normal competitive process which would benefit users in terms of 
TXLFNHUF\FOHVRILQQRYDWLRQ0LFURVRIWUHGXFHGµWKHWDOHQWDQGFDSLWDOLQYHVWHGLQLQQRYDWLRQ
of media players, not least its RZQ¶239 0LFURVRIW¶VFRQGXFWDIIHFWHGµDPDUNHWZKLFKFRXOGEH
a hotbed for new and exciting products springing forth in a climate of undistorted 
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FRPSHWLWLRQ¶240 In contrast, commentators have argued that comparison shopping sites do not 
provide any such innovative services.241 ,QIDFW LW LVHYHQGHEDWDEOH WKDW WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
comments regarding WMP as a µhotbed for new and exciting products¶ were accurate given 
the technological developments of the last decade, which should serve as a warning sign that 
regulators are unlikely to be able to predict how competition might develop in dynamic 
industries. Furthermore, unlike in Microsoft ZKHUH 0LFURVRIW¶V FRQGXFW SUHYHQWHG 2(0V
IURPFKRRVLQJRQHRI:03¶VFRPSHWLWRUVDVWKHRQO\PHGLDSOD\HUWRLQVWDOORQQHZ3&V242 
in Google Search not only users are free to exclusively use competitor comparison shopping 
sites whilst still using Google Search*RRJOH¶VJHQHUDOUHVXOWSDJHVWKHPVHOYHVSURYLGHXVHUV
with alternative shopping choices in the organic results displaying links to Amazon, eBay, 
retailers, etc. The existence of alternatives like Amazon, eBay, etc also suggests that there is 
no issue of reducing innovation on the relevant markets. Factors such as downloading other 
media players not being a realistic alternative to using the media player that comes pre-
installed on the PC243 or end-user inertia244 or insecurity of unsophisticated users concerning 
downloading another media player245 which were relevant for assessing foreclosure in 
Microsoft are unlikely to exist in Google Search. An Internet user who is sophisticated 
enough to purchase a product online and who is potentially going to use a comparison 
shopping site in the process will presumably be aware of the existence of other websites than 
Google Search. Unlike a given PC being operated by only a single operating system, there are 
numerous shopping websites on the Internet that an average Internet user can visit directly.246 
Similarly, such a consumer is more than likely to have mobile Internet which provides 
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DGGLWLRQDO DOWHUQDWLYHV IRU VKRSSLQJ LQ WKH IRUP RI DSSV DV ZHOO DV IRU RWKHU µVSHFLDOLVW¶
queries such as travel, navigation, etc. No matter what the market share of Google is on 
search ± assuming that search is a relevant market, which is doubtful ± Google Search is not 
the only way to search, let alone access the Internet (unlike the Windows OS being the only 
way to operate a PC on which it is the preinstalled operating system).  
iv. Objective justification 
As with all other abuses, objective justification is applicable to rebut a finding of abusive 
tying as well. In this context, it is useful to consider the potential remedy, consumer harm and 
objective justification together. This is because if a finding of abusive tying is made, the 
UHPHG\ ZRXOG QRUPDOO\ EH WKH UHTXLUHPHQW WR µXQWLH¶ WKH EXQGOHG SURGXFWV ,Q Google 
Search, this is likely to be along the lines of ordering Google not to develop and/or display 
any specialist features such as the Google Shopping Commercial Unit on the general result 
pages since otherwise it is difficult to envisage how the alleged tie may be ended. However, 
such a remedy has the potential to harm consumers by preventing Google from innovating 
because it would limit the options available to Google for displaying search results and be 
tantamount to requiring Google to give up on a product improvement. If this is not taken into 
account in the context of establishing abuse, for example, while establishing whether there is 
anticompetitive foreclosure, then it should at least be considered in the assessment of an 
objective justification in Google Search. In its investigation into similar practices, the FTC 
KDV IRU H[DPSOH IRXQG WKDW *RRJOH¶V GHVLJQ FKDQJHV ZHUH D µTXDOLW\ LPSURYHPHQW¶ DQG
Google likely benefited consumers by prominently displaying its specialist content on its 
search result pages.247 Thus, even if despite all the issues discussed above concerning tying, a 
case of abusive tying could be made in Google Search, the consumer benefits from the tie 
would need to be assessed to establish whether they can outweigh the anticompetitive effects 
in question. On the basis of available facts, it is most likely that such benefits would outweigh 
any effects of the conduct on competitors. 
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III. Normative Assessment of the Alleged Abuse  
 
The discussion of the three main existing types of potential abuse in Section II has 
demonstrated the formidable difficulties with fitting Google Search into the existing 
frameworks for these abuses. Without seriously disrupting the existing parameters of these 
abuses as established by the current jurisprudence under Article 102TFEU (and thereby, 
potentially breaching the principle of legal certainty), the facts of Google Search cannot be 
fitted under any of these established categories of abuse. This is because the facts raise 
fundamental problems for the case law such as how there can be a refusal to deal when there 
is strictly speaking no refusal; how there can be discrimination between trading parties when 
there is no trading-party relationship between the dominant undertaking and the relevant 
parties; how there can be a tie when there are not separate products/services and when the 
alleged tying product is available without the alleged tied product under certain 
circumstances, etc. Consequently, a normative assessment of whether the facts of Google 
Search should be found abusive gains fundamental importance. This section will conduct 
such a normative assessment under one principled conceptualisation RIµDEXVH¶ 
For a normative assessment, one might think that a good starting point would be the 
objectives of Article 102TFEU, since these could shape the ideal application of the provision 
to a novel set of facts. Unfortunately, the objectives of Article 102TFEU are not settled and 
are subject to debate.248 Faced with the criticism that its approach to unilateral conduct under 
Article 102TFEU is formalistic, not sufficiently based on economic effects and serves to 
protect competitors rather than competition,249 the Commission started a review of its 
approach in early 2000s which culminated in the Guidance Paper on Enforcement Priorities. 
According to the Guidance, in applying Article 102TFEU to exclusionary conduct by 
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dominant undertakings, the Commission will focus on those types of conduct that are most 
harmful to consumers.250 The Commission will, therefore, direct its enforcement ensuring 
that markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency and 
productivity which results from effective competition between undertakings.251 Further, the 
Commission is mindful that what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process 
and not simply protecting competitors, which may mean that competitors who deliver less to 
consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.252 
Commentators have remarked that with the adoption of the Guidance, consumer welfare and 
efficiency are now at the heart of Article 102TFEU.253  
Whether or not consumer welfare and efficiency have become the guiding principles 
IRU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V HQIRUFHPHQW the EU Courts have not been sufficiently consistent in 
their judgments concerning the objectives and application of Article 102TFEU in individual 
cases to establish the precise objectives of the provision.254 Some commentators note that at 
least recently, the EU Courts have revealed a consistent tendency to stress competition, 
efficiency and consumer welfare as the key objectives of Article 102TFEU.255 Other 
commentators disagree, particularly on the basis of the recent judgment of the GC in Intel 
which they argue to reject an effects-based approach to Article 102TFEU serving the aim of 
enhancing consumer welfare and efficiency.256 Given the controversy surrounding the 
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rationale underpinning Article 102TFEU which has not been resolved by the EU Courts,257 
the normative discussion of whether a given set of facts should breach Article 102TFEU has 
to be based on a conceptualisation of abuse developed elsewhere. The current author has 
developed such a concept of abuse elsewhere which will underlie the discussion in this 
Section.258 Under this conceptualisation of abuse, there are three cumulatively necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a given conduct to be abusive. These are exploitation, exclusion and 
a lack of an increase in efficiency.259 The rest of this Section will elaborate on this 
conceptualisation of abuse and its requirements (A); apply this framework to the facts of 
Google Search (B); and, discuss the issue of the remedy in case of a finding of infringement 
in Google Search since the potential remedy has significant implications for establishing 
whether the conduct in question should constitute abuse in the first place (C). 
 
A. The concept of abuse and its requirements 
The first requirement of the particular conceptualisation of abuse being used for the 
QRUPDWLYH DVVHVVPHQW LV µH[SORLWDWLRQ¶ 7KLV UHTXLUHPHnt results from a reading of Article 
102TFEU itself which, at face value and on the basis of historical analysis,260 is concerned 
only with the exploitation of the customers/suppliers of the dominant undertaking. In fact, it 
was never questioned whether Article 102TFEU covered exploitative abuse; the only debate 
was whether it covered exclusionary abuse at all.261 Although most of the existing case law 
on Article 102TFEU concerns exclusionary conduct, the main objection to an undertaking 
with market power is indeed its ability to exploit its position in a way that would not be 
possible for an undertaking on a competitive market.262 It is noteworthy that the requirement 
of exploitation results from the provision of Article 102TFEU itself and therefore remains 
necessary for that provision to be infringed irrespective of what the objectives of the 
                                                                                                                                       
PRACTICE 521, 530 (2014); Luc Peeperkorn, Conditional pricing: Why the General Court is wrong in Intel (and 
what the Court of Justice can do to rebalance the assessment of rebates), [2015] (1) CONCURRENCES 43, 43-44. 
257
 Petit, supra note 256, at 29-30. 
258
 See AKMAN, supra note 23 in particular Chapter 8. 
259
 AKMAN, supra note 23, at 300 et seq. 
260
 For a historical analysis of the EU competition rules on the basis of the travaux préparatoires relating to the 
negotiations of the Treaty, see Akman, supra note 125.  
261
 Hence, the ruling in Continental Can, supra note 18, ¶ 26 that Article 102TFEU is not only aimed at 
practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them 
through their impact on an effective competition structure. 
262
 JONES AND SUFRIN, supra note 96, at 367. 
67 
 
provision may be stipulated to be by the Commission and the EU Courts. Having said that, 
within an effects-based and consumer-welfare-orientated approach, exploitation can and 
should be used as the test of harmful effects of conduct that would qualify the conduct as 
abusive.263 Indeed, another reason why exploitation should be deemed necessary to establish 
abuse is that it is exploitation that shows harm to someone other than the competitors of a 
dominant undertaking in the context of Article 102TFEU, particularly given the possibility 
that exclusionary effects can be established on the basis of harm to competitors alone under 
the existing jurisprudence.264 In this context, exploitation can be defined as the receiving of 
advantages by the dominant undertaking to the disadvantage of its trading partners that would 
not be possible but for WKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VGRPLQDQFH265  
The second condition of abuse is that the exploitative conduct should also harm or 
UHVWULFW FRPSHWLWLRQ ZKLFK FDQ EH SKUDVHG DV LW EHLQJ µH[FOXVLRQDU\¶ 7KH UHTXLUHPHQW RI
exclusion is derived not from Article 102TFEU itself,266 but from the fact that the rule is 
IRXQG XQGHU µUXOHV RQ FRPSHWLWLRQ¶ LQ WKH 7UHDW\ DQG WKH-then Article 3(f)EEC which 
VWLSXODWHGWKDWWKHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH&RPPXQLW\LQFOXGHGWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQRIDV\VWHPHQVXULQJ
WKDWFRPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKHFRPPRQPDUNHW LVQRWGLVWRUWHG¶267 This provision is now found in 
3URWRFROZKLFKVWDWHVWKDWWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWµLQFOXGHVDV\VWHPHQVXULQJWKDWFRPSHWLWLRQ
LVQRWGLVWRUWHG¶7KHUHTXLUHPHQWLQ3URWRFROWKDWFRPSHWLWLRQLVQRWGLVWRUWHGFDQEHXVHG
to incorporate the condition of harm to competition (ie exclusion of competition) to interpret 
the concept of abuse in Article 102TFEU as only covering exploitation that results from or is 
                                            
263
 AKMAN, supra note 23, at 302. 
264
 AKMAN, supra note 23, at 302. 
265
 AKMAN, supra note 23, at 303. 
266
 This author respectfully disagrees with the interpretation that Article 102(b)TFEU prohibits exclusionary 
conduct as argued by some commentators (see eg 2¶'ONOGHUE AND PADILLA, supra note 44, at 240 et seq). 
$UWLFOH E7)(8 SURKLELWV µOLPLWLQJ SURGXFWLRQ PDUNHWV RU WHFKQLFDO GHYHORSPHQW WR WKH SUHMXGLFH RI
FRQVXPHUV¶ $V VXFK LW GRHV QRW VWLSXODWH DQ\WKLQJ DERXW H[FOXVLRQ RU IRUHFORVXUH SURGXFWLRQ PDUNHWV RU
technical development can be limited to the prejudice of consumers (ie exploit consumers) by the unilateral acts 
of a dominant undertaking without any exclusion or foreclosure of competition or competitors. Notably, while 
establishing that Article 102TFEU also covers exclusionary conduct, the CoJ used the examples in paragraphs 
(c) and (d) of Article 102TFEU and not (b); Continental Can, supra note 18, ¶ 26. This is not to say that the 
&R-¶V RYHUDOO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQ Continental Can was correct; this author has argued elsewhere that this 
interpretation was incorrect and confused two things: the issue of whether Article 102TFEU applies to mere 
exclusion and the issue of whether harm to competition (in the shape of exclusion) is necessary for the 
exploitative practices listed in Article 102TFEU to be abusive; AKMAN, supra note 23, at 309. 
267
 AKMAN, supra note 23, at 307-308. With the Treaty of Maastricht, Article 3(f)EEC was amended by deleting 
the wRUGVµWKHLQVWLWXWLRQRI¶DQGEHFDPH$UWLFOHJ(&DQGODWHUEHFDPH$UWLFOHJ(&ZLWKWKHHQWU\LQWR
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999). 
68 
 
in some other way related to harm to competition.268 Such exclusion and consequent harm to 
competition can comprise horizontal or vertical foreclosure (ie the exclusion of direct 
competitors or of customers of the undertaking).269 This should relate to the exclusion of 
undertakings at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking, unless the 
Commission/claimant can prove that the exclusion of not-yet-as-efficient competitors can 
harm competition in a given case.270 
The third requirement for conduct to be abusive is that it does not lead to an increase 
in efficiency; unilateral conduct that leads to a (non-trivial) increase in efficiency and thus 
has an efficiency explanation should not be found abusive.271 The assessment of efficiency 
should be made comparing the situation with the allegedly abusive conduct in place and the 
situation without the dominant XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V FRQGXFW LQ SODFH WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW the 
alternative conduct that the undertaking would possibly adopt if the investigated conduct is 
found abusive.272 The requirement of efficiency not only enables an approach conforming to 
the original intent behind Article 102TFEU, it also ensures that conduct that is otherwise 
normal and legitimate business practice is not prohibited.273 A consequence of this 
requirement is that if a certain practice is available to and commonly practised by non-
dominant undertakings as well, then it should mean that such conduct is not abusive: abusive 
practices are those that are only possible as a result of the position of dominance that the 
undertaking enjoys.274 
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B. Application of the framework to the facts in Google Search 
i. Exploitation  
To establish whether there is exploitation in Google Search one must focus on the effects of 
the alleged conduct on the trading partners of Google. As mentioned above,275 there is some 
debate as to who the trading partners/customers of Google are. It is clear that advertisers are 
the trading partners of Google due to being in a contractual relationship with Google and 
according to some, they are the only trading partners of Google.276 There are also strong 
arguments for accepting that the potentially infinite number of websites the links to which 
might appear on the general result pages in response to a search on Google Search cannot be 
deemed to be the trading partners/customers of Google.277 The question whether the users of 
Google Search are potential trading partners/customers of Google is one that requires further 
elaboration. However, for the sake of argument and to enable a more encompassing 
discussion of exploitation, it will be assumed for present purposes that a case could be made 
that the users are trading partners/customers of Google. 
The first question is then whether the advertisers are H[SORLWHGE\*RRJOH¶V DOOHJHG
SUDFWLFH RI µIDYRXULQJ¶ LWV RZQ VSHFLDOLVW VHUYLFHV As noted by one commentator, the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQDSSHDUVWREHOHVVIRFXVHGRQWKHSRWHQWLDOWRLQFUHDVHSULFHVRI
ad spaces to advertisers than the failure to actively promote other comparison shopping 
websites.278 This is despite the fact that even if the issue of foreclosure were addressed, there 
would still be two other issues to deal with, one of them being whether Google would be in a 
position to increase prices as a result of its conduct.279 Given that the service is free to users, 
the question concerning the ability to increase prices becomes that of whether Google 
exploits the advertisers by, for example, charging supra-competitive prices for ads, as a result 
of its alleged favouring its own specialist services. Some commentators have suggested that 
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the alleged abuse in Google Search may indeed involve exploitation of advertisers through 
excessive prices, price discrimination, etc.280 
In Google Search,an argument of exploiting the advertisers runs into several 
problems. The first and fundamental point is that advertisements on Google are chosen 
through an auction: it is the advertisers themselves who bid for the ad space on the basis of 
their willingness to pay.281 Whether or not a given ad is displayed depends on how much a 
given advertiser is willing to pay for a given search query and the relevance of the ad for that 
query.282 7KLVPHDQVWKDWHYHQLIDJLYHQDGYHUWLVHU¶VPD[LPXPELGIRUDJLYHQVHDUFKWHUPLV
ORZHU WKDQ WKH ULYDO¶V ELG WKH IRUPHU DGYHUWLVHU¶V DG PD\ DSSHDU DERYH WKH ODWWHU¶V GXH WR
higher relevance.283 Moreover, an advertiser only pays for an ad once a user clicks through 
the link.284 *LYHQ WKLV IDFWXDO FRQWH[W LW LV GLIILFXOW WR HQYLVDJH KRZ *RRJOH¶V DOOHJHG
prominent display of the Google Shopping Commercial Unit (which comprises ads with 
images, price information, etc) can exploit advertisers as a result of disfavouring the results of 
competing comparison shopping sites. Furthermore, proving exploitation of advertisers 
would also require proving that Google is not sufficiently exposed to competition in the sale 
of ad spaces.285 This would necessitate demonstrating that the alternatives available to 
advertisers such as advertising on other search engines, social media, mobile apps or even on 
offline media do not apply competitive pressure on Google in terms of attracting 
DGYHUWLVHPHQWV ,W LV DOVR QRWHZRUWK\ WKDW *RRJOH¶V EXVLQHVV PRGHO LWVHOI FUHDWHV D
competitive alternative to the advertisements since the organic results ± that are always 
displayed in response to the same search query that triggers the display of advertisements on 
the basis of relevance ± are not paid for and essentially constitute free promotion for the 
websites that appear in the organic results. This also points out that the alleged demotion of 
comparison shopping sites on the general result pages, even if true, could not in itself lead to 
the exploitation of advertisers by Google because the space that is saved by any such 
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demotion is taken up by other organic results which provide alternativess for users. Finally, 
given that exploitation refers to taking advantage of customers in a manner that would not be 
possible but for the dominance of the undertaking, the fact that other search engines (which 
would not be dominant even if Google were) adopt similar practices towards displaying 
specialist ads, text ads and organic results on their pages suggests that the conduct is not 
exploitative. The conduct in question, therefore, does not seem to have an impact on the 
position of advertisers vis-à-vis Google that could be deemed exploitative.  
If the conduct in question were found to have exploitative effects on advertisers, there 
would still be a question of whether this is the relevant type of exploitation under Article 
102TFEU. This is because, as argued elsewhere, the interests of final consumers and (other) 
customers of the dominant undertaking may not always be aligned.286 This distinction 
becomes particularly important if a policy choice is made, for example, by the Commission to 
adopt a (properly defined) consumer welfare standard in its enforcement.287 Under such a 
FRQVXPHUZHOIDUHVWDQGDUGWKHµH[SORLWDWLRQ¶WKDWXOWLPDWHO\UHQGHUVFRQGXFWDEXVLYHshould 
be deemed to be that of the final consumer.288 It is this question of whether final consumers 
LHXVHUVDUHH[SORLWHGE\*RRJOH¶VDOOHJHGFRQGXFW LQGoogle Search that this article now 
turns to. 
The second possible type of exploitation is that of users of Google Search, assuming 
that a trading relationship could be said to exist between them and Google. The relevant 
question is whether the alleged display of Google Shopping results more prominently than 
the results of comparison shopping sites exploits users. This is a difficult argument to sustain 
because both the generalist results and the specialist results are provided for free to the 
users.289 Furthermore, any exploitation is disputed by the factual findings of the FTC which 
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suggest that users have benefitted from Universal Search (namely, Google displaying Google 
Shopping results prominently as well as organic results in response to a product search).290 
Given that any space vacated by not displaying a comparison shopping site is taken up by 
alternatives to those sites including sites where the users can directly make a purchase and a 
large part of these are organic results for which Google receives no payment, it appears also 
too difficult to argue that users will pay higher prices for the items that they might purchase 
after clicking on links within the Shopping Commercial Unit (even if the ads in this space 
cost more for advertisers than ads in comparison shopping sites).291 A reduction in the quality 
RI WKH JHQHUDO UHVXOW SDJHV GXH WR *RRJOH¶V SURPLQHQW GLVSOD\ RI *RRJOH 6KRSSLQJ
Commercial Unit (eg due to Google receiving higher remuneration for a less relevant result) 
could be seen as a potential exploitation of users, but is tempered by the fact that it is the 
relevance of results that attracts both the users and the advertisers to the search engine in the 
first place. Thus, the reduction in the relevance of results would lead users to conduct fewer 
searches on Google Search and/or to switch to another search engine.292 Such a strategy of 
leveraging market power from general search to specialist search has also been remarked to 
be not profitable to Google for EHLQJµHFRQRPLFQRQVHQVH¶E\GLYHUWLQJXVHrs from general 
VHDUFK WR LWV VSHFLDOLVW VHUYLFHV *RRJOH ZRXOG EH JLYLQJ XS RQ D PRQRSROLVW¶V DGYHUWLVLQJ
profit on the lost searches (given the allegation that Google is dominant on the general search 
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market) to gain market share on a more competitive market (ie the market for comparison 
shopping), thereby lowering its total profits.293 All in all, the first condition of abuse fails to 
be satisfied. 
ii. Exclusion  
The second requirement of abuse, namely exclusion of competition from competitors at least 
as efficient as the dominant undertaking that constitutes harm to competition appears not to 
be met in Google Search either. The relevant exclusionary conduct allegation is that certain 
specialist websites lose traffic due to not being ranked as prominently as they were before 
Google started prominently displaying its own Shopping results with the consequence that 
they are excluded from the comparison shopping market. Foremost, it has to be noted that 
there is no outrighW H[FOXVLRQRI*RRJOH¶VVSHFLDOLVW YHUWLFDOFRPSHWLWRUVIURPWKHJHQHUDO
result pages (just like there is no coercion of consumers to choose results higher up in the 
results).294 Thus, if the loss of traffic is the cause of the alleged exclusion, it needs to be taken 
into account that provided that their results are relevant, these specialist sites still receive free 
traffic from Google Search. Moreover, given that many ± if not most ± of the comparison 
shopping sites in question have stayed in business despite the alleged diversion of traffic for 
nearly a decade,295 it is highly questionable whether there is any actual or potential exclusion. 
An alternative explanation for those sites which have not stayed on the market might be 
found in the changing preferences of consumers regarding online shopping and the rising 
prominence of merchant platforms such as Amazon as well as the normal effects of 
competition.296 
Second, what matters is harm to competition and not the effect of conduct on certain 
competitors for the sake of preserving the competitive positions of those competitors. 
Commentators have noted that a requirement imposed by competition law to consider purely 
H[WHUQDOHIIHFWVRQFRPSHWLWRUVLHWKHHIIHFWVRI*RRJOH¶VWHFKQRORJical or business decisions 
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on the profits of other websites) would be perverse as competition itself necessarily imposes 
negative externalities on competitors (in the form of reduced profits and lower prices that 
benefit consumers).297 It has to be reiterated that what the competitors lose is essentially a 
form of free promotion by Google, hence the characterisation by the German Court of their 
relation to Google Search as free-riders.298 Furthermore, in Google Search the alleged 
conduct in question continues to generate free traffic to the websites displayed under the 
organic results and these are also competitors of Google for users conducting a product 
search such as Amazon, various retailers, etc. Indeed, the FTC has found that although 
changes to GooglH¶VDOJRULWKPPD\KDYHUHVXOWHGLQ WUDIILFORVVWR WKHGHPRWHGFRPSDULVRQ
VKRSSLQJVLWHVWKHVDPHFKDQJHVFDQEHYLHZHGDVLPSURYLQJWKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\RI*RRJOH¶V
search results because the first page now presents users with a greater diversity of 
websites.299 Thus, even if some competitors may have been harmed, competition is unlikely 
to have been harmed because of the numerous options still available to users wishing to 
search for and purchase items online and the numerous websites still receiving free traffic 
from Google Search. Given that both the EU Courts and the Commission have stipulated that 
effective competition may lead to the departure from the market of less efficient undertakings 
who deliver less to consumers in terms of price, choice, quality, innovation, etc, without this 
being anticompetitive under Article 102TFEU,300 the failure of some comparison shopping 
sites does not in itself represent the type of harm to competition that the EU competition rules 
seek to prevent. 
iii. Lack of an increase in efficiency 
The third requirement of abuse also does not appear to be met in Google Search. As already 
alluded to above, the move from the ten-blue-links to Universal Search by Google and its 
competitors is considered to be an improvement in the provision of the search engine service 
which increased the efficiency of the service to users by improving quality through 
LQQRYDWLRQLHG\QDPLFHIILFLHQFLHV*RRJOH¶VGLVSOD\RILWVRZQFRQWHQWKDVEHHQIRXQGWR
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be an improvement in WKHTXDOLW\RI*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKSURGXFWE\WKH)7&301 Commentators 
also seem generally to agree that Universal Search is seen as an improvement by consumers 
in their experience.302 The introduction of Universal Search, which required Google to refine 
its assessment of the intent behind a search and then provide a link to the best available 
information for that intent regardless of its form, is perceived as an important intermediate 
step toward the ultimate goal of providing information directly.303 Providing information 
GLUHFWO\WRXVHUVLQUHVSRQVHWRFRPSOLFDWHGTXHULHVVXFKDVµVKRZPHIOLJKWVXQGHU¼IRU
SODFHVZKHUH LW¶VKRW LQ'HFHPEHUDQG ,FDQVQRUNHO¶ which no search engine can currently 
answer indeed appears to be the ultimate goal of Google which would present a further 
improvement in the search engine service provided to users.304 Thus, it is clear that the 
conduct in question is a legitimate business practice that increases the efficiency and 
attractiveness of the search engine and ultimately benefits consumers through innovation. All 
in all, none of the conditions of the particular conceptualisation of abuse under investigation 
is met on the basis of the available facts in Google Search. 
 
C. The Potential Remedy 
The potential remedy in Google Search presents one of the most significant challenges in the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQ 7KLV LV EHFDXVH LW UHPDLQV XQFOHDU ZKHWKHU WKHUH LV DQ
appropriate remedy that can be imposed by the Commission. Under Article 7, Regulation 
1/2003 where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of Article 102TFEU, it may 
by decision require the undertaking concerned to bring such infringement to an end.305 For 
this purpose, the Commission may impose on the undertaking any behavioural or structural 
remedies which are proportionate to the infringement and necessary to bring the 
infringement effectively to an end.306 Structural remedies can only be imposed either where 
there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural 
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remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural 
remedy.307 Thus, any remedy to be imposed has to be effective, apply in relation to the 
infringement that has been established and be proportionate to that infringement.308 The 
principle of proportionality means that the burdens imposed on an undertaking to bring an 
infringement of competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary 
to attain the objective sought, namely re-establishing compliance with the rules.309 
On the basis of the allegations, the remedy in Google Search is potentially that of 
µWUHDWLQJ DOO FRPSDULVRQ VLWHV LQ WKH VDPH PDQQHU as Google treats its own comparison 
VKRSSLQJVHUYLFHE\VXEMHFWLQJWKHPDOOWRWKHVDPHDOJRULWKP¶$VQRWHGEHIRUHWKH62WRRN
the preliminary view that to remedy the conduct, Google should treat its own comparison 
shopping service and those of rivals in the same way.310 This suggests that the expectation is 
for Google to subject all comparison shopping sites to the same algorithm as Google 
Shopping (Commercial Unit), namely the algorithm that Google applies to advertisements 
that generate revenue to Google even though the comparison shopping sites in question 
ZRXOG QRW EH SD\LQJ IRU DQ\ DG VSDFH RQ *RRJOH¶V JHQHUDO UHVXOW SDJHV311 Notably, the 
former Commissioner expressly indicated that imposing such a strict equal treatment 
obligation (ie that Google should apply the same algorithm to rank all search results including 
its own) would not be indispensable to remedy the concern in question and would not be 
proportionate, implying that it would not be justified under EU competition rules.312 The 
former Commissioner further noted that requiring Google to treat its own services in the 
exact same way as those of its competitors would mean that, depending on the results of the 
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DOJRULWKP *RRJOH¶V RZQ VHUYLFHV PLJKW QRW DSSHDU on its own page.313 According to the 
IRUPHU &RPPLVVLRQHU WKLV ZRXOG µFHUWDLQO\ EH DQ XQSUHFHGHQWHG FRQVWUDLQW LPSRVHG RQ D
FRPSDQ\E\DQDQWLWUXVWDXWKRULW\¶DQGZRXOGQRWEHLQWKHXVHUV¶EHVWLQWHUHVW314 
Other than the question whether such a remedy of equal treatment can be achieved 
and effectively supervised in practice,315 it is unclear whether in Google Search there is a 
potential remedy the imposition of which can be legally justified and make commercial sense.  
First, there is the issue of what such a remedy of subjecting comparison shopping sites 
to the same algorithm that Google subjects Google Shopping (Commercial Unit) would 
entail. Such a remedy could require Google to display the merchant results that the 
competitor shopping sites would display in response to a particular product search. However, 
there are several problems with such a remedy. First, it is inconsistent with the way that 
search engines operate and compete with one another since the competition between search 
engines takes place through the display of their own results, not results of others. Second, it is 
unclear how Google could obey such a remedy. There are two options: first, Google may be 
required to show results of the comparison shopping sites on the basis of the algorithms that 
these sites themselves use; or, second, Google may be required to apply its own algorithm to 
WKHPHUFKDQWRIIHUVDYDLODEOHLQWKHFRPSDULVRQVKRSSLQJVLWHV¶LQYHQWRULHV316 Even if either 
of these options were technically possible without reducing the quality of search results for 
users by causing delays, etc both options would be tantamount to ordering Google to allow its 
competitors to monetize its page real estate by placing product offers in that space for which 
the rivals have been paid for by advertisers.317 This would not only dampen competition, but 
also reduce the incentives to innovate of both Google and its competitors.  
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Irrespective of the question what exactly the remedy would entail, there is a second 
obvious problem concerning the remedy, as noted by the German Monopolies Commission: 
the operator of a search engine does not need to manipulate the search algorithm to take 
advantage of the preferential display of its own services since knowing the algorithm already 
enables the operator to design the websites for its own services in a way that would enable 
them to rank higher more easily in the generic search results.318 Thus, even if Google were to 
apply the same algorithm to Google Shopping and to the comparison shopping sites, simply 
by virtue of knowing the algorithm, it could ensure that Google Shopping ranks higher than a 
comparison shopping service. It must be noted that the German Monopolies Commission 
does not recommend the separation of general and specialised search services since it finds 
that this would be disproportionate.319 Moreover, such separation would impose on Google a 
compulsory reduction of the quality of its results for users since a free search engine service 
that presents universal results is more valuable to users than a free service that presents ten-
blue-links. Furthermore, such separation would constitute divestiture.320 However, given that 
*RRJOH¶VVSHFLDOLVWUHVXOWVDUHVLPSly a subset of its general search results rather than separate 
operations, it is difficult to envisage what exactly Google could be asked to divest. There 
would potentially be no limit to such an imposed reduction in quality ± since that would be 
ultimately what separation and divestiture involve ± as the more search queries there are for 
which a competitor may have a website that represents a subset of queries that Google can 
answer, the more specialist results that Google would have to refrain from displaying on its 
JHQHUDOVHDUFKUHVXOWSDJHV1RWRQO\ZRXOGWKLVEHDQXQMXVWLILDEOHLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ*RRJOH¶V
design choices over its proprietary content, such separation would also harm consumers by 
reducing the relevance and, thus, the quality of the results that they would receive for 
searches on Google Search. 
A third problem with the potential remedy is that imposing an obligation that Google 
VXEMHFWV LWV RZQ VKRSSLQJ UHVXOWV DQG FRPSHWLWRUV¶ VKRSSLQJ VLWHV WR WKH VDme algorithm 
ignores the revealed preferences of users. Users who choose to conduct a search on Google as 
opposed to another search engine or a comparison shopping site can be presumed to do so out 
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of preference given the availability of other options. Thus, making Google display the results 
of competitors in the same manner as it displays its own results ± when the comparison 
shopping sites are available to access for anyone valuing their services ± disregards the 
preferences of users who want to see *RRJOH¶V UHVXOWV. Moreover, it implies ignoring the 
preferences of users in order to make Google provide free promotion to its competitors. This 
entails questioning whHWKHU WKH FRQVXPHUV KDYH WKH µULJKW SUHIHUHQFHV¶ HYHQ WKRXJK VXFK
paternalism is alien to competition law.321 Intervening without very good evidence that 
informed consumer choice is impossible in the circumstances of the case would result in the 
Commission overruling consumer preferences instead of protecting them against 
restrictions.322 
A related fourth issue with the potential remedy is that given that the comparison 
shopping sites (and other sites) do receive free traffic from Google by being displayed in the 
organic results when relevant, the remedy inherently must involve more than the provision of 
free traffic. Indeed, the potential remedy implies the active promotion of comparison 
shopping sites by Google, for free, in the general result pages. This begs two questions: first, 
ZK\ DQ\ VLWH VKRXOG EH SURPRWHG IRU IUHH E\ *RRJOH ZKHQ *RRJOH¶V IUHH VHDUFK HQJLQH
service to users is funded almost exclusively by advertisers who pay for the space on the 
general result pages (ie the exact same thing that the competitors would be entitled to for 
free). Second, why comparison shopping sites deserve and are more entitled to this enhanced 
free promotion of their websites by Google any more than, for example, Amazon or eBay or a 
given merchant is. Such entitlement to enhanced promotion is a direct result of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI D UHOHYDQW PDUNHW DV WKDW RI FRPSDULVRQ VKRSSLQJ DQG LWV
definition of that market in a particular way. If the relevant market is not that of comparison 
shopping or if the market of comparison shopping as defined by the Commission also 
included merchant platforms such as Amazon, eBay, etc, then the remedy would involve little 
more than the Commission protecting the interests of comparison shopping sites as opposed 
to other sites like Amazon, etc and thereby, distorting competition between competitors.323 
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However, market definition is an entirely artificial construct that has been called an 
incoherent process as a matter of basic economic principles.324 Real markets do not come 
defined. Market definition is an exercise that serves to establish the group of products that are 
sufficiently substitutable with one another.325 In Google Search, it is highly likely that 
comparison shopping services is either not a relevant market or if it is, it includes merchant 
platforms such as Amazon, eBay, etc which currently are not acknowledged as part of the 
relevant market by the Commission.326 As noted by one commentator, µWKHUH PLJKW EH
something wrong if policymakers systematically identify different competitors compared to 
WKRVH WKDW WKH FRPSDQLHV WKHPVHOYHV FRQVLGHU WR EH WKHLU ULYDOV¶327 Notably, Amazon and 
eBay both consider themselves to be competing with general search engines as well as 
comparison shopping sites.328 7KXV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V HQYLVDJHG UHPHG\ PD\ UHVXOW LQ
arbitrarily protecting some competitors ± in fact, likely those less preferred by consumers ± 
over others.  
Fifth, the potential remedy involves Google practically paying for the promotion of its 
ULYDOVE\WKHXVHRI*RRJOH¶VVHUYLFHV7KLVLVEHFDXVHGoogle earns revenue from the display 
of Google Shopping (Commercial Unit) results which are ads. The space in which Google 
might be ordered to treat its competitors in the same way as it treats Google Shopping is 
*RRJOH¶V DG VSDFH &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH UHPHG\ ZLOO entail *RRJOH WUHDWLQJ WKH FRPSHWLWRUV¶
sites which do not involve any advertisement return to Google in the same way as revenue 
generating advertisements, thereby losing the potential revenue from paid-for advertisements 
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in the same space, to promote the services of its competitors on its own property. This is 
equivalent to not only making Google promote competition against itself, but also making 
Google practically pay (an amount equivalent to the forgone revenue from not displaying a 
potentially revenue-generating ad in the same space) for such promotion. It is difficult to 
contemplate how such a remedy might be considered proportionate and necessary. 
To sum, it is challenging to envisage exactly what could be legitimately required of 
Google to remedy its allegedly infringing conduct. The potential lack of an appropriate 
remedy should prompt the Commission to reconsider whether there is an infringement in the 
first place. It has indeed been remarked that at this stage in Google Search, it is difficult to 
LPDJLQHDUHPHG\WKDWZRXOGEHQHILWFRQVXPHUVPRUHWKDQWKHµGRQRWKLQJ¶Rption.329 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This article has conducted a positive and a normative assessment of whether the conduct in 
Google Search as identified by the Commission breaches Article 102TFEU. Regarding the 
positive law assessment, three of the most likely theories of abuse (ie refusal to deal, 
discrimination and tying) have been considered. A thorough analysis of the provision of 
Article 102TFEU as well as the case law thereon reveals that fitting the publicly available 
facts of Google Search into one of these existing types of abuse is equivalent to trying to fit a 
square peg in a round hole. Without entirely disregarding some of the fundamental concepts 
and rules underlying the existing framework for these abuses, the facts of Google Search 
cannot be fitted into these categories of abuse. A normative legal assessment of the conduct 
in question, the necessity of which arises from the list of practices in Article 102TFEU being 
indicative and from the lack of precedent in EU law, also reveals that these facts should not 
be fitted into the framework of Article 102TFEU. Under the conceptualisation of abuse 
adopted for this normative assessment, the requirements of abuse are not fulfilled: the facts in 
Google Search do not indicate the relevant type of exploitation, exclusion or lack of an 
LQFUHDVH LQHIILFLHQF\UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VFRQGXFW&RXSOHGZLWKWKH
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serious issues surrounding the potential remedy as well as the possibility that no appropriate 
remedy exists, Google Search clearly presents a testing challenge for the Commission. 
Reaching the incorrect outcome in Google Search can lead to a chain of other 
incorrect interventions in Europe and beyond, as well as a reduction in incentives of other 
companies to take risks, invest and innovate. Commentators have indeed remarked that on the 
basis of an error-cost framework, an antitrust action against Google is ill-advised and creates 
substantial risk for a false positive, which would chill innovation and competition in fast 
moving markets that currently benefit consumers.330 Arguably, antitrust authorities have 
historically not treated novel business practices or innovative practices kindly, and economics 
has tended to ascribe anticompetitive explanations to new forms of conduct that are not-well-
understood.331 Antitrust scrutiny of innovation is likely to be biased towards assigning a 
higher likelihood of anticompetitiveness to a given practice than later literature and evidence 
will suggest is reasonable or accurate.332 Not only is the theoretical literature on innovation 
and competition insufficient to instill any great confidence in our ability to establish which 
antitrust policies would encourage innovation and result in consumer gains, stakes are also 
higher in cases concerning innovation than in regular antitrust cases on the basis of the well-
established link between economic growth and innovation.333  
Google Search is an opportunity for the Commission to demonstrate its dedication to 
an enforcement objective that distinguishes harm to competitors from harm to competition 
and consumers under Article 102TFEU. Whether competition and consumers have been 
harmed by any of *RRJOH¶Valleged practices has to be established beyond a demonstration of 
harm to some competitors. As the publicly available facts stand, it appears unlikely that 
*RRJOH¶VSUDFWLFHVunder scrutiny have harmed or even can harm consumers. The fact that a 
VHDUFKRQ*RRJOH6HDUFKQHYHUUHWXUQVDQRWKHUZLVHHPSW\SDJHZLWKUHVXOWVIURP*RRJOH¶V
own specialist services and related advertisements but always involves free, organic results 
ZKLFKLQPDQ\FDVHVJHQHUDWHWUDIILFWR*RRJOH¶VPDMRUFRPSHWLWRUVVuch as Amazon) is an 
important fact to remember when establishing whether competition has been harmed. Any 
infringement decision in Google Search should, therefore, demonstrate that the case is not 
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about ZKRµLVJRLQJWRJHWWKHLUKDQGVRQ¶WKHSRWHQWLDOUHYHQXHIURPDGYHUWLVHUV, but is about 
protecting competition in order to ultimately benefit consumers.334 
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 See Attheraces where the Court of Appeal (of England and Wales) held that this case concerning the supply 
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